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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODS 
 
The report of the MacLean Committee on serious violent and sexual offenders 
(Scottish Executive, 2000) identified a need for further research into risk assessment 
and recidivism in relation to this group. In response to the MacLean Committee 
recommendations the Scottish Executive commissioned research on risk assessment 
tools in use in Scotland. The aim of this research is to provide an audit of risk 
assessment instruments currently in use with serious violent and sexual offenders, to 
describe how they are used and to assess progress with the validation of risk 
assessment instruments for use in Scotland.  
 
Two principle methods of data collection were employed in this study. This first 
consisted of a postal survey (audit) of tools and approaches being employed to assess 
risk among serious violent and sexual offenders in Scotland. This was supplemented 
by interviews with a range of professionals involved in risk assessment to explore in 
greater depth the issues associated with risk assessment and management in practice. 
 
 
TOOLS IN USE IN SCOTLAND 
 
Various different approaches to risk assessments were being adopted by different 
professional groups working in different settings across Scotland. Social workers 
were most likely to use tools developed to assess risk of recidivism amongst general 
offender populations while the police did not make use of standardised instruments in 
the risk assessments they undertook.   
 
Psychologists – in prisons and in forensic health settings – were most likely to employ 
tools that had been developed to assess risk of sexual or violent offending (or close 
correlates thereof) that had been validated, though only three of the tools used had 
been validated against Scottish populations.  
 
Tools in use had mostly been validated against or based on research evidence derived 
from male populations. Particular populations for whom existing tools were 
considered mostly inappropriate included young offenders (under 18 year of age), 
women and offenders with mental health problems.  
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
Risk assessments were undertaken in a variety of contexts, including prisons 
community justice settings, secure and medium secure units and mental health in-
patient and out-patient facilities. Risk assessments variously informed risk 
management plans, helped inform multi-agency risk management strategies, assisted 
in the matching of offenders to interventions and aided recommendations regarding 
release/discharge/ sentencing in court. 
 
Various professionals were involved in the completion and interpretation of  risk 
assessments. They had, in most cases received training appropriate to this task and 
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mechanisms appeared to be in place to quality assess the work. Risk assessments 
usually were time-consuming and resource demanding and sometimes constrained by 
external time frames. Respondents also identified important gaps in the availability of 
information to inform risk assessments, including witness statements and court 
records.  
 
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Tools had most often been adopted for use in risk assessments on account of the ease 
with which they could be administered and/or scored, their ability to identify risk of 
harm and their ability to identify the risk of sexual offending. Social workers were 
more likely to use tools that were relatively easy to administer while psychologists 
were attracted to tools that had been validated, particularly if normative data for 
Scotland were available. One specialist project had developed its own tools which, 
although it had not been validated, was being considered for national adoption by the 
police.  
 
A primary consideration for all professional groups in their approach to risk 
assessment was the ability to make defensible decisions backed up by appropriate 
tools. Different tools and approaches were perceived to have different strengths, 
however their ability to inform risk management plans was considered critical. 
Weakness associated with different tools included their complexity, their lack of 
objectivity, their lack of validation and their inability to measure the specific risks 
associated with the types of offenders who are the subject of this report.  
 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Tools had most often been adopted for use in risk assessments on account of the ease 
with which they could be administered and/or scored, their ability to identify risk of 
harm and their ability to identify the risk of sexual offending. Social workers were 
more likely to use tools that were relatively easy to administer while psychologists 
were attracted to tools that had been validated, particularly if normative data for 
Scotland were available. One specialist project had developed its own tools which, 
although it had not been validated, was being considered for national adoption by the 
police.  
 
A primary consideration for all professional groups in their approach to risk 
assessment was the ability to make defensible decisions backed up by appropriate 
tools. Different tools and approaches were perceived to have different strengths, 
however their ability to inform risk management plans was considered critical. 
Weakness associated with different tools included their complexity, their lack of 
objectivity, their lack of validation and their inability to measure the specific risks 
associated with the types of offenders who are the subject of this report.  
 
 
MULTI-AGENCY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
 
There was a general recognition, among those who participated in the research, of the 
value of a multi-agency approach to risk assessment and, in particular, to risk 
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management, though the extent to which this occurred was somewhat variable. 
Opinions were divided as to whether it was feasible or desirable to implement a 
common approach to risk assessment across different disciplinary groups, though a 
greater degree of consistency would be welcomed.  
 
Multi-agency risk management operated in different ways and at different levels 
within various settings. The strengths of multi-agency approaches to risk management 
included the increased ability to tailor responses to the risks presented by an 
individual and the avoidance of a single agency being accountable for any adverse 
outcomes. Effective multi-agency approaches could, however, be undermined by 
issues such as the failure to share relevant information and the varied approaches 
adopted by different agencies towards risk assessments and their interpretation. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study revealed wide variations in the approaches adopted to assessing risk among 
serious violent and sexual offenders by different professional groups. Even within 
agencies or professional groups different methods of risk assessment were evident, 
though there was evidence of a movement towards greater consistency within prisons 
and across Scottish police forces. Little use was being made of validated risk 
assessment tools outwith prison and health settings and concerns were expressed 
about the absence of tools for use with young people, women and mentally disordered 
offenders. The current situation undoubtedly detracts from the effectiveness of multi-
agency risk assessments and may have adverse consequences for the effective 
management of offender risk.  
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND METHODS 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES  
 
1.1 The report of the MacLean Committee on serious violent and sexual offenders 
(Scottish Executive, 2000) identified a need for further research into risk assessment 
and recidivism in relation to this group. In response to the MacLean Committee 
recommendations the Scottish Executive commissioned research on risk assessment 
tools in use in Scotland. The aim of this research was to provide an audit of risk 
assessment instruments currently in use with serious violent and sexual offenders, to 
describe how they are used and to assess progress with the validation of risk 
assessment instruments for use in Scotland.  
 
1.2 The specific objectives of the research were to: 
 
• Conduct an audit of the risk assessment instruments and techniques currently used 
with serious offenders in Scotland by different professional groups; 
 
• Identify the range of risks assessed by different instruments and by different 
professional groups in determining which offenders pose a high risk to public 
safety; 
 
• Describe how the instruments are used, including an examination of their 
administration; 
 
• Examine the use made of risk assessment information in different contexts, 
including if and how this information is translated into risk management for 
different groups of offenders by the range of professionals and how different 
professional groups work together and communicate in respect of risk assessment 
and risk management; and 
 
• Assess progress with the validation of different instruments for use with different 
groups of offenders in Scotland and review any existing evidence on their 
predictive efficacy.  
 
1.3 The research takes account of the wide range of professional groups using risk 
assessment tools, the differing tools and differing views of risk subsequently 
generated, and issues for inter-agency risk assessments and multi-agency responses to 
risk management. The main methods used are (a) a literature review; (b) an audit of 
risk assessment tools via a survey; (c) interviews with managers and staff involved in 
the use of risk assessment tools across a range of agencies and professional groups; 
(d) observation, where appropriate, of the use of tools ‘on the ground’1; (e) 
exploration of implementation issues, including the interface between the secure 
establishment and the community, and mental health services and the community.; 
and (e) exploration of the role of multi-agency fora in the assessment and 
management of offender risk.  The literature review (including the assessment of the 
                                                     
1 This, in practice, did not prove to be a feasible since in most cases risk assessments were conducted 
over several contacts with offenders and/or were based on the review of documentation from a range of 
sources. 
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predictive efficacy of tools) is published as a separate report (Kemshall, 2002). A 
review of the statistics and literature on recidivism among serious violent and sexual 
offenders constitutes the third report in this inter-related series. (Loucks, 2002). The 
present report presents the findings from the audit of risk tools (a national survey of 
risk assessment tools utilised by different professional groups involved in assessing 
risk among serious violent and sexual offenders) and in-depth interviews with a range 
of professionals involved in risk assessment and risk management in Scotland. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
1.4 Two principle methods of data collection were employed in this study, with the 
resulting findings integrated throughout this report. In essence the research involved a 
broad, largely quantitative audit of tools in use across Scotland combined with a more 
detailed qualitative analysis of approaches to risk assessment and management among 
different professional groups. 
 
Audit of risk assessment instruments in use 
 
1.5 In order to determine the range of tools employed in Scotland, and their validation 
status, a survey of relevant agencies was conducted. The survey aimed to gather, via 
completion of a relatively structured questionnaire, the following information: 
 
• Type of tools in use. 
• The reasons for their adoption. 
• Their validation status and proposals for any future validation. 
• Offender group and risks covered by the tool. 
• Grade and type of staff involved in their use. 
• How they are administered and quality assured. 
• Type of setting used in. 
• Scale of multi-agency use and significant inter-agency issues. 
 
1.6  A two-stage approach was adopted in the survey. Relevant organisations were 
first contacted by letter to establish whether they were willing to participate in the 
survey and to obtain details of individuals to whom questionnaires should be sent for 
completion. Two questionnaires were then sent to those individuals identified by their 
organisation as having responsibility for completing them. The first sought 
information about the range of risk assessment tools employed by the organisation2. 
The second questionnaire sought information about specific risk assessment tools, 
with a questionnaire being completed for each type of tool employed. A covering 
letter provided guidance on the completion of the questionnaires. Copies of both 
questionnaires and the accompanying guidance are provided as an Annex to this 
report. 
 
1.7 Initial contact letters were sent to each of the Scottish Police Forces, all local 
authority social work departments, the Scottish Prison Service, Secure Units for 
                                                     
2 The summary form also asked respondents to provide estimates of the numbers of serious violent and 
sexual offenders and mentally disordered offenders known to their organisation who met the 
developing criteria for an Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR). This data was intended for use in the 
review of statistics and literature on recidivism among serious violent and sexual offenders. In practice, 
however, the differing bases on which estimates were apparently made prevented any meaningful 
conclusions from being reached from them about the numbers of these high risk offenders in Scotland. 
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Children, Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Units, Secure and Medium Secure 
Hospitals, Forensic Psychological/Psychiatric Services, Intensive Psychiatric Care 
Units and a range of voluntary organisations involved in providing services to 
offenders. The letters requested that where more than one group of professionals or 
area of service might be involved in risk assessments, each be asked to complete a 
questionnaire relating to their area of responsibility.  
 
Response 
 
1.8 Sixty summary audit responses were returned. The organisations that responded to 
the audit were as follows: 
 
• 35 summaries were received from 24 (of the 32) local authority social work 
departments. This included separate returns from four prison social work units and 
two specialist projects involved in work with sex offenders. Whilst most local 
authorities completed a single form covering criminal justice social work services 
– usually completed by the service manger - two submitted summaries completed 
at an area level. One local authority response pertained to addiction services and 
one summary was returned by a manager of children and families services.   
 
• 15 summaries were obtained from seven police forces. This included nine separate 
responses from the divisions in Strathclyde police. The forms were completed by 
officers with a variety of ranks: Detective Sergeant (5); Detective Inspector (3);  
Constable (3); Sergeant (1); Detective Constable (1); and sex offender registrar 
(1). In one case the designation of the person who completed a summary form was 
not provided. 
 
• Seven summaries were completed by staff in health service settings, though in one 
case the organisation was not identified and three respondents indicated that they 
did not employ risk assessment tools with these groups of offenders. Three 
respondents were psychologists (in two cases chartered forensic psychologists), 
one was a consultant psychiatrist, one was a nurse and one was a risk management 
advisor. In one case the designation of the person completing the form was not 
provided. 
 
• Two summaries were completed by prison psychologists (one on behalf of the 
Scottish Prison Service and one on behalf of HMP Kilmarnock). The Scottish 
prison Service has recently developed a uniform risk assessment procedure for use 
with long-term prisoners (that is, those serving sentences of four years or more). It 
was therefore agreed that a single set of forms would be completed on behalf of 
the agency, rather than separate forms being completed by each establishment in 
which serious violent and sexual offenders may be detained. The private prison at 
Kilmarnock adopted a similar approach to risk assessment as the Scottish Prison 
Service. 
 
• One summary was submitted by a voluntary organisation involved in the 
provision of services to young offenders as an alternative to custody. For the 
purpose of comparative analysis by professional group or setting, the response 
from this organisation is included with the social work responses.  
 
1.9 Respondents were asked to complete an individual questionnaire for each tool in 
use in their organisation. Since organisations often made use of more than one tool, 
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the total number of completed questionnaires was higher – at 99 – than the number of 
organisations that responded. The numbers of individual questionnaires completed by 
the respective professional groups were: social work3 (67); police (15); prison 
psychologists (12); and health (5). It should be noted that no information was 
available about the extent of usage of each tool within an organisation, nor can it be 
assumed that the failure of an organisation to respond to the audit implied that they 
were not involved in risk assessments or the use of risk assessment tools.   
 
Interviews with professionals involved in risk assessment 
 
1.10  Interviews were conducted with a range of professionals involved in the 
assessment of risk among serious violent and sexual offenders. The majority of 
respondents were identified through the audit responses, with additional agencies 
approached to widen the range of, in particular, health settings included in the study. 
The information provided by these latter respondents about the types of risk 
assessment tools employed supplemented the data obtained through the audit of risk 
tools.  
 
1.11 Twenty-two individuals were interviewed from a range of settings. One 
respondent, who had a split post, was able to offer comment on approaches to risk 
assessment in two different settings (prison and health). The number of interviews 
conducted with respondents from different settings was as follows: prison, including 
the private prison at HMP Kilmarnock (7); police (3); health (4)4; social work (8)5; 
and the voluntary sector (1)6.  
 
1.12  All of the interviews were tape recorded and fully transcribed for analysis. They 
explored similar issues covered in the audit, but in greater depth and with a view to 
identifying issues associated with risk assessment and risk management in practice. 
The broad areas covered in the interviews were: the types of tools or approaches 
employed and the reasons for their adoption; the advantages and disadvantages of 
different tools and approaches to risk assessment; how the tools were administered, 
including ‘quality control’ measures; the relationship between risk assessment and 
risk management; and issues arising from multi-agency involvement in risk 
assessment and risk management.  
 
 
                                                     
3 This includes the voluntary organisation’s return. 
4 This includes respondents from the State Hospital, a medium secure unit and forensic mental health 
services for adults and adolescents. 
5 This includes two social workers from specialist projects and a Sex Offender Liaison Officer 
(SOLO). 
6 A voluntary sector project working with children and young people who sexually abuse others. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
 
1.13 The remainder or this report is organised into six chapters. In Chapter Two the 
range of approaches to risk assessment by different professional groups is discussed 
and the progress of validation in respect of the different risk assessment tools in use is 
examined. Chapter Three focuses upon risk assessment in action: who carries out risk 
assessments, how they are carried out and the mechanisms that are in place to ensure 
a consistent approach to risk assessment within organisations. In Chapter Four the 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to risk assessment 
are considered while Chapter Five explores how risk assessments inform risk 
management and Chapter Six examines issues associated with multi-agency 
involvement in risk assessment and management. In Chapter Seven the conclusions 
are presented along with a classification of risk assessment tools and approaches in 
use in Scotland against a number of essential and desirable criteria for risk assessment 
tools derived from previous research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN USE IN 
SCOTLAND 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 This chapter provides an overview of the risk assessment tools and other 
approaches to risk assessment that were employed by different professional groups 
who participated in the audit and in the research interviews. Whilst the list is clearly 
not exhaustive (being influenced by the individuals and organisations who responded 
to an invitation to participate in the research), it nonetheless provides an indication of 
the varying approaches to risk assessment that are in place and an indication of how 
approaches to risk assessment vary between different professional groups.  
 
2.2 The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed description of the features 
of different risk assessment tools and the types of risk they purport to assess. Such a 
description is provided in the report by Kemshall (2002) to which readers of this 
report are referred. However, to ease understanding of this report, brief details of 
some of the more widely used risk assessment tools (drawn largely from Kemshall, 
2002) are provided in an Annex to this report (Annex Two). 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF TOOLS IN USE 
 
2.3 Table 2.1 presents a summary of the risk assessment tools in respect of which 
individual audit forms were completed. The most commonly used tools were the 
RAGF and the LSI-R, with more specialist tools employed relatively infrequently and 
usually then by psychologists in prisons or healthcare settings. The most striking 
feature of the data in Table 2.1 is the absence of a consistent approach to risk 
assessment across the different professional groups.  
 
2.4 Social work departments were mostly making use of non-specialist tools in their 
risk assessments. The RAGF was mentioned by 25 social work respondents, including 
the prison social work units that responded separately to the survey while LSI-R was 
included in 19 social work returns. Matrix-2000 was the most common ‘specialist’ 
tool being used by social workers, being employed by four local authorities. Three 
local authorities were employing Crime Pics in their assessment of serious violent and 
sexual offenders and two indicated that they made use of the Dunscore. The latter 
instrument is an actuarial tool that was developed to assist social workers in assessing 
offenders’ risk of having a custodial sentence imposed by the courts. 
 
2.5 One specialist sex offender project (The Tay Project) had developed its own risk 
assessment tool – TAYPREP30 – which focused upon 14 historical (static) factors 
and 16 contemporary (dynamic) factors. This tool – which has still to be validated – 
was also increasingly being used by other local authority social work departments. 
Four social work departments other than the one in which the project is based 
reported making use of the Tay Project assessment tool, though not all completed an 
individual audit form for this tool. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of tools is use (number of returns which mentioned the tool)  
 
Tool Social 
Work 
Police Prison Health Total 
RAG-F 25    25 
LSI-R 19  1  20 
Procedure developed by police  12   12 
Matrix 2000 4 1 1  6 
Locally developed procedures 4   1 5 
HCR 20   2 2 4 
Tay Project Assessment 1 2   3 
Crime Pics 3    3 
PCL-R   2 1 3 
Dunscore 2    2 
Static 99 1  1  2 
SARA   2  2 
HOAG 1    1 
RRASOR 1    1 
SVR-20   1  1 
VRS   1  1 
VRS-50   1  1 
SAOQ 1    1 
YLS 1    1 
Other 4   1 57 
Total 67 15 12 5 99 
 
 
2.6 A second specialist project, which worked with adolescent abusers and which 
participated in interviews but not in the audit, had also developed its own risk 
assessment form based upon tools used by other projects working with this younger 
age group.  The initial risk assessment would be undertaken over a period of three 
months, involving a minimum of 12 sessions with the young person.  
 
2.7 A different approach to risk assessment was adopted by police forces. Completed 
audit returns suggested that little use was being made of structured risk assessment 
tools. Instead, forces had developed their own risk assessment frameworks and 
protocols, sometimes in collaboration with local social work departments:  
 
“Police utilise a police developed risk assessment tool” 
 
“Not named but is used for risk assessment of sex offenders” 
 
2.8 In interviews police officers reported that a national working group had developed 
a standard document for use in risk assessments that essentially served as a tool for 
information gathering. Risk assessments drew upon information from a range of 
sources, including home visits to the offender. They were normally undertaken first 
within two weeks of an offender’s release from prison and the document completed 
again on each subsequent visit. Police officers emphasised the importance of 
gathering ‘intelligence’ as part of their risk assessments and to inform risk 
management strategies, for example: 
 
                                                     
7 This includes an individual rating form, a drug and alcohol assessment, an approach based on 
Sainsbury’s risk assessment, Barnardo’s Brief Assessment and a structured tool for the assessment of 
sexually aggressive children and young people. 
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“…where does the person live? Who does he live with? Who lives by 
him? What vehicle does he drive? What does he do for a living? All 
sorts of stuff that we need to manage while he is in the community that 
can reduce his risk as well. E.g. if he is living next to a vulnerable 
family we would have to take action to get him moved, or maybe 
disclose to them to give them some protection.” 
 
For this reason, existing risk assessment tools, such as Matrix 2000, were viewed as 
providing only some of the information the police required. 
 
2.9 Police respondents sometimes referred to their approach to risk assessment as 
‘holistic’, drawing upon information provided by a range of agencies (though most 
commonly social work) involved in sex offender risk assessment and management. 
For example: 
 
“…a holistic approach to R/A [risk assessment] in conjunction with SW 
RA3+4 and clinical rating form where these are available.” 
 
2.10 Several police respondents pointed to the absence of a consistent national 
approach to risk assessment as a weakness of the current arrangements (making it 
more difficult, for example, to share information with other forces if offenders moved 
address). This issue was being addressed by ACPO (Scotland) who were considering 
the possibility of the Tay Project Assessment Tool being introduced as a standardised 
approach across each of the Scottish forces. 
 
2.11 The most disappointing response to the risk audit was from health agencies. 
Some of those who did respond indicated that they were not involved in risk 
assessments of serious violent or sexual offenders or, if they were, only on a very 
occasional basis. However what is evident from the health respondents - including the 
prison psychologists and psychologists in forensic/secure settings – is their greater 
reliance upon standardised and/or validated specialist tools such as the HCR-20, PCL-
R and SARA (Spousal Assault Risk Assessment).  
 
2.12 The two-stage SPS risk assessment procedure involves an initial collateral file 
review, which may trigger a more detailed psychological risk assessment, undertaken 
by a forensic psychologist under the supervision of a chartered forensic psychologist. 
The detailed risk assessment includes the administration of the HCR-20 and other 
psychometric tools as required, though SPS acknowledge the importance of the 
resulting psychological reports being considered in conjunction with other relevant 
sources of data (Scottish Prison Service, 2001). 
 
2.13 This was confirmed in interviews conducted with social workers and 
psychologists in forensic settings and in prisons, who also variously made mention of 
the SVR 20, CARE (Child Abuse Risk Evaluation), the VRAG and SORAG, though 
one respondent suggested that the latter two instruments would only be employed to 
supplement risk assessments because of their actuarial nature. Another respondent 
stressed the value of combining structured clinical and actuarial methods, with the 
latter providing a cross check for the structured clinical opinion: 
 
“If the two measures are out of sync you would have to go back and look 
at your structured opinion again so it’s quite a good check to see if the 
methods are all consistent.” 
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2.14 The same respondent suggested that Scottish research had shown that actuarial 
measures could have similar predictive ability to structured clinical assessments, 
though the former were less helpful in informing multi-disciplinary risk management 
plans.  
 
 
TYPE OF TOOLS IN USE 
 
2.15  Respondents were asked to indicate whether each of the tools included in the 
audit was actuarial (i.e. using a formal objective procedure such as an equation), 
structured clinical (i.e. based on clinical assessment of risk factors) or a combination 
of both. In two-thirds of returns (64) the tools were described involving as a 
combination of actuarial and structured clinical methods, in 23 they were described as 
structured clinical and in 9 they were classed as being solely actuarial8.  However it 
also appears that respondents had some difficulty classifying instruments in this may, 
since the same tool was often categorised differently by different respondents. For 
instance, The RAGF was described as actuarial by one respondent, as structured 
clinical assessment by 6 respondents and as a mixture of both by 17. Likewise, LSI-R 
was categorised by 16 respondents as involving actuarial and clinical approaches, by 
two as involving actuarial methods and by one as involving structured clinical 
assessment.  
 
2.16  In the majority of audit returns (90) the tools were said to assess both static risk 
factors (i.e. factors not amenable to change, such as age or criminal history) and 
dynamic risk factors (i.e. factors amenable to change, such as offender attitudes). In 
only four reruns were static factors alone said to have been assessed by the tools 
while in three returns only dynamic factors were said to have been assessed9. 
 
 
WITH WHOM THE TOOLS ARE USED 
 
Types of offenders 
 
2.17  The types of offenders with whom the tools were employed are summarised in 
Table 2.2. Overall, risk assessments were most often undertaken with sexual 
offenders. However in 43 returns tools were described as being ‘generic’ in their use, 
that is applied to all types of offenders. This was true of tools designed for general 
offender populations, such as the RAGF, LSI-R and Crime Pics.  
 
 
                                                     
8 Data were missing in three cases. 
9 Data were missing in two cases. 
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Table 2.2: Types of offenders with whom risk assessment tools were employed 
 
Type of offender Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=15) 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=99) 
Sexual 58 15 9 3 85 
Violent 47 - 11 3 61 
Mentally disordered 38 - 6 4 48 
Other 5 - 3 1 9 
 
 
2.18 With the exception of the police – whose risk assessments were confined to 
sexual offenders – the other professional groups were utilising risk assessment tools 
with a range of offenders. However, the proportions of different types of offenders 
assessed varied across the groups. Social workers were most likely to use the tools in 
the assessment of sexual offenders while the tools used in prison were most often 
applied to violent offenders and those used by health professionals were most often 
applied to the assessment of mentally disordered offenders. Some reservations were 
expressed about the use of generic tools, such as the LSI-R, in assessing risk among 
particular categories of offenders, including sexual offenders: 
 
“Acknowledge that this tool is not helpful with sex offenders, serious 
violent offenders, domestic violence and often women.” 
 
“LSI-R is pretty useless for sexual offenders and domestic violence and 
there are other categories that it is not perfect for – women offenders, 
road traffic in some cases.” 
 
“Concerns about use with sex offenders and young people have led to 
considerations of using other tools.” 
 
2.19 LSI-R may be more limited in its applicability with these groups of offenders 
because the relative significance of the factors it draws upon to derive a composite 
risk score may vary according to the type of offence and may also differ between men 
and women (McIvor et al., 2001).  
 
2.20 Although the current risk assessment tools being used in prisons were considered 
by psychologists to be the best currently available, there were some adult prisoners – 
for example those convicted of very serious crimes who have no prior history of 
offending and no evidence of psychopathy - for whom they were said to be not 
“hitting the mark”. This perceived strengths and weaknesses of different types of risk 
assessment tool are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.  
 
Types of risk assessed 
 
2.21 The types of risks assessed by the tools are shown in Table 2.3. Other ‘risks’ that 
were said to be assessed included attitudinal change, risk of custody, risks related to 
drug use, criminogenic needs and the existence of serious personality disorder. 
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Table 2.3: Types of risks assessed 
 
Type of risk Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=14)10 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=98) 
General recidivism 43 3 4 2 52 
Sexual offending 28 14 8 2 52 
Violent offending 29 2 6 3 40 
Harm 39 7 5 2 53 
Other 8 - 4 1 13 
 
2.22 Social workers were most likely to use tools that predict risk of general 
recidivism and risk of harm, with the latter being assessed principally through the use 
of the RAGF. Psychological risk assessment tools, on the other hand, were more often 
used to assess specific types of risk. 
 
Age of offenders 
 
2.23 Table 2.4 shows the ages of offenders with whom the tools were reported to be 
employed. The ages of offenders upon whom risk assessments were conducted could 
not be easily classified, since different agencies were assessing offenders in different 
age groups, depending upon their remit and the nature of the setting. To simplify 
matters, the tools referred to in the audit returns have been classified according to 
whether they were reported to be used with young people under 16 years of age, with 
young offenders (that is, those aged between 16 and 20 years of age) or with adults 
(that is, those aged 21 years and over).  The column total in Table 2.4 exceeds the 
number of returns received since some in many cases the tool included in the audit 
was said to be used with more than one age group of offender. 
 
2.24 It is clear that in the majority of cases tools were being used with adults. Only 
social workers and the police indicated in the audit that they made use of risk 
assessment tools with young people under 16 years of age.   
 
Table 2.4: Age of offenders with whom the tools were used 
 
Age of offender Number of returns (n=99) 
Under 16 28 
16 – 20 years 78 
21 years and over 95 
 
2.25 The voluntary sector project that worked with adolescent abusers observed that 
the age and risk profile of their clients had changed in recent years. Whilst older 
adolescents were still being referred, they tended to be those presenting the highest 
risk. Increasingly they – and other similar projects – were working with children 
under 12 years of age and in some instances with children as young as four or five. A 
second trend that the project had observed was an increase in the number of girls 
being referred, many of whom had been abused themselves and were exhibiting 
“concerning” behaviour. Finally, this project also suggested that perhaps as many of 
40 per cent of the children and young people they worked with had learning 
difficulties. The specialist social work project working with adults in the same area 
also estimated that around 40 per cent of their referrals involved people with learning 
difficulties. 
                                                     
10 Data were missing in one case. 
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2.26 Two of the interviewees worked with children and young people who had 
sexually abused others or who were displaying inappropriate sexual behaviour. Both 
stressed the inappropriateness of existing tools for use with children because the 
factors they covered were not necessarily appropriate to the younger age group. A 
clear need was therefore identified for a risk assessment tool that could be applied in 
different settings in Scotland where work is undertaken with young people who 
sexually abuse others. As one respondent explained: 
 
“If I am asked to do a risk assessment on a 14 year old who has 
committed a sexual offence…I have a big problem in terms of doing that. 
I can either rely on clinical impression, which is the way it has been done 
for decades and it is the way it is still being done by many professionals 
in the NHS … or I can take the tools that are currently available and 
adapt them to fit that group… I think this is a better way of doing it 
rather than just having a subjective impression of risk, but I think it’s not 
a good way of doing it… I have a problem with other professionals 
making judgements on risk and dangerousness without providing 
systematic evidence, without identifying all the risk factors and backing 
up their evidence.” 
 
2.27 This respondent suggested that the absence of risk assessment tools for use with 
children and young people possibly reflected the fact that intervention with adolescent 
offenders had traditionally been the responsibility of child psychiatry and child and 
family social work services, neither of which have specific expertise in forensic risk 
assessment. In addition, there was said to be an absence of relevant research from 
which structured clinical or actuarial measures might be developed.  
 
2.28 Research is currently being conducted into the relative effectiveness of the Youth 
Level of Service Case Management Instrument (YLS-CMI)– a version of the LSI-R 
that has been developed to provide a general assessment of risk and needs among 
young people – and a youth version of the PCL-R. Initial indications suggest that 
YLS-CMI is a useful initial screening tool for boys, but that it is less so for girls 
because girls have different criminogenic needs. This would be consistent with the 
previous finding that the LSI-R has less predictive accuracy with women (McIvor et 
al, 2001). 
 
2.29 The need for a robust risk assessment tool for use with adolescents was believed 
to be urgent in view of the proposals contained in the Criminal Justice Bill for the 
introduction of Orders for Lifelong Restriction. These orders could be imposed upon 
offenders of all ages, with decisions about their imposition informed by risk 
assessments, despite the available evidence to support risk assessments of adolescents 
still being weak. 
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Sex of offenders 
 
2.30 In 30 of the returns the tools included in the audit were used exclusively with 
men, while in 68 returns they were used with both men and women11. The sex of the 
offenders with whom the tool is used will, of course, be partly influenced by the 
setting in which it is employed. In a male prison, for example, risk assessments will 
be carried out exclusively with men. 
 
2.31 Tools employed with both men and women were more likely than those 
employed solely with men to assess risk of general recidivism and risk of harm. 
Conversely, tools employed uniquely with men were more likely than those employed 
with men and women to assess risk of sexual or violent offending.  
 
2.32 In general, there was a view among those interviewed that there were no tools 
available that were specifically for use with women and the applicability of some 
existing tools for use with women was called into question.  
 
Mentally disordered offenders 
 
2.33 Interview respondents explained that the HCR-20 can be used with people with 
mental health problems and can be used with women. However the PCL-R, despite its 
widespread use in prisons and forensic health settings, has not been designed 
specifically for a psychiatric population. This, one respondent suggested, means that 
care needs to be taken when using it with mentally disordered offenders, since certain 
behaviours may be present as a result of mental health problems, rather than being an 
indication of underlying psychopathy.  
 
 
VALIDATION STATUS 
 
2.34 Respondents were asked to indicate whether the risk assessment tools they used 
had been validated. As Table 2.5 indicates, in fewer than half of returns were the tools 
to which the referred known to have been validated. Social workers and police were 
least likely to have employed validated tools while all the tools employed by prison 
psychologists and most used in health settings were said to have been validated in 
some context. It should be noted, however, that respondents’ understanding of the 
nature, process and importance of validation may have varied across professional 
groups. Psychologists would be most likely to be expected to have detailed 
knowledge of the evaluation status of the instruments they employed while it may be 
assumed that other professionals had less technical expertise in this respect. The 
information gathered about the validation status of the instruments will consequently 
be based on varying levels of understanding and its accuracy will therefore be 
variable as a result. 
 
                                                     
11 Data were missing in one case. 
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Table 2.5: Perceived validation status of the tools referred to in audit returns 
 
Has tool been validated? Social 
Work 
(n=63) 
Police 
(n=14)12 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=94) 
Yes 26 1 12 3 42 
No 12 8 - 1 21 
Don’t know 25 5 - 1 31 
 
2.35 According to audit respondents, locally developed tools had not been validated, 
nor had one of the most widely used generic risk assessment tools, the RAGF. Tools 
what were said to have been validated included the LSI-R, Matrix 2000, Crime Pics, 
Static 99, SARA, HCR-20, RRASOR, PCL-R, SVR-20, VRS, VRS-50 and SOAQ. In 
most returns in which respondents indicated that the tool had been validated (35) it 
had been validated by the person or persons who developed it. In some cases tools 
developed elsewhere (e.g. LSI-R, PCL-R) were said to have been validated for use in 
the UK. Tools were thought by audit respondents to have most commonly been 
validated against prison populations, followed by samples of offenders subject to 
supervision in the community (Table 2.6). 
 
 
Table 2.6: Settings in which the tool was understood to have been validated 
 
Tools for use with sexual 
offenders 
Number Tools for use with violent 
offenders 
Number 
Prison 16 Prison 17 
Community supervision 9 Community supervision 11 
Mental health 4 Mental health 6 
Specialist programme 4 Specialist programme 3 
 
 
2.36 The characteristics of the samples that were understood to have been used to 
validate the tools are summarised in Table 2.7. Around one quarter of the returns 
indicated that the tools they referred to had been validated for use with UK 
populations but only 15 returns indicated that they had been validated using a Scottish 
sample to generate local norms. Tools were, it seems, most likely to have been 
validated for use with adult populations, with only two returns indicating that the 
tools to which they referred had been validated for use with young people under 16 
years of age. In one third of the returns the tool was understood to have been 
validated using populations of male offenders. However in less than one half of this 
number of returns were tools thought to have been separately validated for use with 
women. In only 12 returns did respondents indicate that the tool being used been 
validated for use with offenders with mental health problems.  
 
                                                     
12 Data were missing in one case. 
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Table 2.7: Samples understood to have been employed for validation of tools 
 
Type of sample Number 
UK sample (non-Scottish) 24 
Scottish sample 15 
Under 16 years of age 2 
16-20 years of age 17 
Adults (21 years of age and over) 29 
Male sample 34 
Female sample 15 
Mentally disordered offenders 12 
 
2.37 In 10 returns respondents indicated that their organisation planned to validate the 
tool for use with sex offenders in prison (5 returns), on community supervision (3 
returns) and in specialist programmes (2 returns). In five returns validation of tools 
for use with violent offenders was planned (in four cases using prison populations). In 
most returns in which respondents indicated that there were plans on place for the tool 
to be validated the timescales for validation were unknown, though one tool was 
expected to be validated within 12 months, one within two years and two within five 
years. 
 
2.38 Whilst the tools employed by other professional groups had not, in general, been 
validated, in interview psychologists expressed a clear preference for validated 
instruments, while recognising that relatively few – the HCR-20, PCL-R and VRAG 
being the primary exceptions – had been validated against Scottish populations 
(Cooke et al, 2001). Psychologists admitted to having greater confidence in tools that 
had been validated and expressed concern at the possibility of being having their risk 
assessments discredited in court if they were not sufficiently evidence-based. As one 
respondent commented, “if it has been validated there is evidence to suggest it has 
merit. If it hasn’t, you are in trouble.” 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
2.39 Various approaches to risk assessments were being adopted by different 
professional groups working in different settings across Scotland. Social workers 
were most likely to use tools developed to assess risk of recidivism amongst general 
offender populations while the police did not make use of standardised instruments in 
the risk assessments they undertook.   
 
2.40 Psychologists – in prisons and in forensic health settings – were most likely to 
employ tools that had been developed to assess risk of sexual or violent offending (or 
close correlates thereof) and that had been validated, though only three of the tools 
used had been validated against Scottish populations.  
 
2.41 Tools in use had mostly, it was understood, been validated against or based on 
research evidence derived from male populations. Particular populations for whom 
existing tools were considered mostly inappropriate included young offenders (under 
18 year of age), women and offenders with mental health problems.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RISK ASSESSMENT IN ACTION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
3.1 Having reviewed in Chapter Two the approaches to risk assessment being adopted 
by different professional groups in Scotland, this chapter describes the manner in 
which risk assessments are carried out. For example, who is responsible for 
undertaking and interpreting risk assessments, what training have they received to do 
so and what systems are in place to encourage consistency in the administration of 
risk assessment tools and their interpretation? This chapter concludes by considering 
a number of issues that have been identified as impacting upon the completion of risk 
assessments in practice. 
 
 
CONTEXTS IN WHICH RISK ASSESSMENTS WERE UNDERTAKEN  
 
3.2 The tools included in the audit were being used in a wide range of settings. This 
included prisons, community justice settings (social work and the police), secure and 
medium secure units, specialist projects for sexual offenders, mental health in-patient 
and out-patient settings, hostels and supported accommodation.  In only 15 instances 
were the tools included in the audit employed alone. More usually, tools were 
employed alongside other tools in the assessment of offender risk. In just over one 
third of returns (36) the tools were always used in combination with other tools, in 16 
returns they were said usually to be used in combination with other tools and in 32 
returns they were reportedly sometimes combined with other tools (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Frequency of combined use of audit tool with other tools 
 
Frequency Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=15) 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=99) 
Always 26 3 5 2 36 
Usually 13 1 2 - 16 
Sometimes 23 3 4 2 32 
Never 5 8 1 1 15 
 
3.3 Social workers were most likely to combine the use of the LSI-R and the RAGF, 
while staff in prison and health settings were more likely to use a battery of 
psychological risk assessment tools. Police were least likely to employ other tools, 
however they observed that the risk assessment procedures that had been developed 
drew upon a range of information from other relevant agencies: 
 
“Police risk assessments will, however, include reference to any relevant 
information supplied by external agencies (e.g. social work) who use 
various assessment tools.” 
 
“As part of the Police Risk Assessment with other agencies, sometimes 
an outside agency may bring into the forum another method of risk 
assessment and that may be incorporated into the overall assessment.” 
 
The issue of multi-agency risk assessments will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter Six of this report. 
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3.4  The purpose to which risk assessments were put clearly varied from agency to 
agency, depending upon the setting and the respondent’s role (Table 3.2). The role of 
risk assessments in informing risk management was emphasised by all professional 
groups whereas the use of risk assessments to inform the development and review of 
intervention or treatment plans was a prominent concern of social workers, 
psychologists and other health service personnel, but not of the police. In general, 
social workers, prison psychologists and health service personnel tended to use risk 
assessments for a wider range of purposes than did the police who, interviews 
suggested, undertook risk assessments mainly to inform their strategies for monitoring 
offenders in the community. 
 
Table 3.2: Purposes to which the tools included in the audit were put 
 
Purpose Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=14)
13 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=98) 
Inform risk management plans 48 14 11 4 77 
Inform multi-agency risk 
management strategies 
 
45 
 
12 
 
8 
 
2 
 
67 
Develop treatment/intervention plans 49 2 11 4 66 
Review treatment/intervention plans 43 2 8 3 55 
Assess/measure offender change 35 9 7 2 53 
Inform recommendations in reports 
to court 
 
50 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
 
53 
Inform recommendations to Parole 
Board 
 
27 
 
- 
 
12 
 
2 
 
41 
Inform decisions about release from 
prison 
 
21 
 
- 
 
12 
 
2 
 
35 
Inform decisions about release from 
hospital 
 
5 
 
- 
 
3 
 
2 
 
10 
Inform decisions about registration 5 1 - 2 8 
Other 5 - - - 5 
 
3.5 Social workers indicated that risk assessments were sometimes put to other uses. 
This included informing recommendations to the children’s panel and decision-
making about children who offend. As one social worker explained, risk assessments 
could be drawn upon to inform “decision-making around a child. Deciding what 
management strategies we need to put into place in the short term.”  
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
Who undertakes risk assessments? 
 
3.6  The questionnaires sought information about the designation of staff involved in 
the administration of the risk assessment tool. The resultant data are summarised in 
Table 3.3. Consistent with the emphasis placed by the police on ‘holistic’ 
assessments, risk assessments conducted by the police were most likely to involve the 
input of other professional groups. 
 
Table 3.3: Personnel involved in the administration of the tools used by different groups 
 
                                                     
13 Data were missing in one case. 
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Person administering the tool Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=14)14 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=98) 
Social workers 67 3 - - 70 
Psychologists - - 12 2 15 
Police - 14 - - 14 
Psychiatrists - 1 - 4 5 
Psychiatric nurses - 1 - 4 5 
Prison officers - 2 - - 2 
 
3.7  Social work risk assessments were conducted and interpreted by criminal justice 
social workers or by social workers in specialist projects or units (for example in the 
medium secure unit). Police risk assessments were carried out by dedicated officers, 
though one police respondent indicated that child protection officers – who had 
received the national training on sex offender assessment and monitoring – would 
undertake this task if workloads became excessively high. In the areas with a social 
work sex offender liaison officer (SOLO) all initial assessments undertaken by 
dedicated police officers would be discussed between the crime manager for the area 
and the SOLO.  In health and prison settings, specialist risk assessments of serious 
violent or sexual offenders were undertaken and interpreted by chartered forensic or 
clinical psychologists. 
 
Training received by staff undertaking risk assessments 
 
3.8Respondents to the audit were unaware in ten returns what type of training staff 
had received in the use of the tools. However in most instances it appeared that some 
form of training had been provided. In 48 returns staff were said to have received the 
initial training as specified by the person or persons who had developed the tool to 
which the return referred. This had been supplemented in 18 returns by locally 
developed training and in eight returns by more in-depth specialist training. In 18 
returns locally developed training alone had been provided in the use of the tool to 
which they referred.  
 
3.9 The police officers who took part in the survey had participated in a five-day 
residential course on the risk assessment and monitoring of sex offenders provided by 
the Scottish Police College at Tulliallan, supplemented in some cases by additional 
training provided locally. However, one police respondent indicated that s/he had 
received no training in this area and was “very much left … to get on with it”. 
 
3.10 Psychologists and other professionals using more specialised, standardised tools 
had received training in their use, usually by the person responsible for developing the 
tool. Interviewees emphasised that psychologists would not be permitted to undertake 
risk assessments using these tools unless they had been trained in and had had some 
supervised experience in their use. In prisons, all risk assessments had to be 
undertaken by or supervised by an accredited, chartered clinical or forensic 
psychologist. 
 
How are the risk assessments carried out? 
 
3.11 In most instances (82 returns) tools were said to be administered through a 
combination of interviews with the offender and the use of information contained in 
                                                     
14 Data were missing in one case. 
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agency records. In 12 returns administration of the tool was said by audit respondents 
to be based solely on an interview with the offender and in four cases administration 
of the tool was reported to require only information derived from existing 
documentary sources15. In a few returns (4) respondents reported that administration 
of the tool also drew upon information from other relevant third parties. 
 
What mechanisms are in place to ensure a consistent approach? 
 
3.12 In four cases no mechanisms were said by audit respondents to have been put into 
place to ensure that the tool was being used appropriately. In most cases (85) staff 
supervision was used as a quality control mechanism, usually supplemented by the 
sampling of cases in which the tool was administered (51 cases) and/or observation or 
video recording of the use of the tool in practice (21 cases and 3 cases respectively).  
Other mechanisms that were in place to ensure that tools were being used 
appropriately included scrutiny of assessments by line managers, assessment 
meetings, co-working, review by an external consultant and external audit by the 
organisation responsible for developing the tool. For example: 
 
“All risk assessments are submitted to and approved by Head of 
Department (Detective Chief Inspector) and Divisional Commander 
(Chief Superintendent) and countersigned with any appropriate 
comment.” 
 
“All risk assessments checked by senior social worker.” 
 
“RAGF 1-3 is much less monitored. RAGF 4 is always scrutinised by the 
line manager.” 
 
“Some co-working is done. Senior social worker reviews all risk 
assessments and makes comments before countersigning.” 
 
“The developing company took a range of samples from the authority 
and audited them.” 
 
3.13 Mechanisms for ensuring consistency in the use and scoring/interpretation of risk 
assessment tools varied across professional groups. In social work departments this 
usually involved a combination of monitoring of Social Enquiry Reports by team 
leaders and staff supervision. Police risk assessments were subject to scrutiny by more 
senior officers and were, in some areas, either conducted jointly with or discussed 
with social workers.  
 
3.14 In some forensic settings risk assessments were viewed as a joint responsibility 
between team members and therefore discussed as a team before being “signed off”. 
Psychologists in prisons and in the State Hospital periodically engaged in exercises 
aimed at checking the consistency of scoring and interpretation of ‘practice’ cases. 
 
How are risk assessments interpreted and by whom? 
 
3.15 Risk assessment tools were reported by audit respondents to be scored or 
interpreted through the use of professional or clinical judgement (37 returns), with 
                                                     
15 Data were missing in one case. 
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reference to a scoring manual (33 returns) or through a combination of both (22 
returns). Social workers were most likely to use professional judgement and a scoring 
manual (either in combination or separately). Prison based psychologists and health 
professionals always used a scoring manual, supplemented in some cases by the use 
of professional judgement16, while the tools used by police officers relied mostly upon 
the exercising of professional judgement. Other methods of interpreting or scoring the 
risk assessment tools included the use of locally developed normative data against 
which scores could be compared, discussion with line managers, reference to research 
and through the use of a computerised programme. 
 
3.16 According to most returns (95) risk assessment tools were interpreted or scored 
by the person who administered them, in some cases in conjunction with others (13 
returns). In only two returns was it indicated that the person who undertook the risk 
assessment was not directly involved in interpreting the results17. The ‘others’ 
involved in scoring/interpretation were usually line managers or other members of 
multi-disciplinary risk assessment fora: 
 
“It is interpreted jointly by police and social worker who administer it. 
The findings are then submitted via a supervisory structure.” (Police 
respondent) 
 
“Multi-disciplinary team, predominantly psychologist and psychiatrist.” 
(Health respondent) 
 
“Scored/assessed by social worker, checked by manager, risk 
management plan drawn up by team manager/senior using multi-agency 
case conference if necessary.” (Social work respondent) 
 
 
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH UNDERTAKING RISK 
ASSESSMENTS 
 
3.17 The interviews revealed a number of issues associated with the practical 
implementation of risk assessments. Broadly speaking, however, these can be grouped 
under two headings: limitations imposed by various resource constraints and 
limitations imposed by the difficulties associated with accessing particular types of 
information.  
 
Resource constraints 
 
3.18 One social work respondent indicated that s/he would prefer to complete a full 
Matrix 2000 assessment for all offenders convicted of a sexual offence for whom a 
Social Enquiry Report  (SER) was being prepared. In practice, however, this was not 
possible within the timescales for preparation of an SER. As a compromise, the static 
element of Matrix 2000 was applied to all sex offender referrals, and a full assessment 
completed for those subsequently placed on statutory orders. The static element alone 
was acknowledged, however, not to be especially helpful in determining the overall 
level of risk. In particular, it was argued that it tended to identify people as lower risk 
than would be the case if a full risk assessment were carried out.  
                                                     
16 An exception to this was the risk assessment tool that had been developed in one Health Trust, which 
relied solely upon professional judgement. 
17 Data were missing in two cases. 
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3.19 In general, risk assessments were acknowledged to be time-consuming, 
regardless of where they were conducted and the types of tools employed. As one 
social worker observed in relation to the RA1-4: 
 
“Normally risk assessments are not just a one-off thing where you 
might interview me and tick a few boxes and say ‘he’s obviously a 
scary guy’…Certainly I did it over several interviews when I was doing 
them.” 
 
3.20 Time constraints were also experienced by prison psychologists when preparing 
risk assessments for prisoner tribunals at the request of the Parole Board. Whilst in 
principle the Parole Board had agreed to request risk assessments three months prior 
to the date of a tribunal, in practice requests often came as little as six weeks in 
advance. 
 
3.21 In the prison setting other time constraints were imposed by the lengths of 
sentences prisoners had received. It was suggested, for example, that there sometimes 
appeared to be a discrepancy between the level of risk presented by an offender and 
the length of custodial sentence imposed. As a result, there was insufficient time 
during the custodial portion of the sentence for risks to be identified and risk factors 
addressed. 
 
3.22 The resources provided for risk assessment and management were said by some 
respondents not to have matched the amount of work involved is assessing and 
managing risk among serious violent and sexual offenders. Much of the activity 
around risk assessment and management by social work and the police was, it was 
suggested, undertaken on a goodwill basis, though, in reality, these agencies – unlike 
some others - did not have the option of declining to become involved in a case. 
 
3.23 Finally, structured clinical assessments undertaken in forensic mental health 
settings were often supplemented by detailed file reviews. Since professionals 
working in one setting were usually reluctant to forward their files to professionals 
working in other settings, this meant that staff who were involved in conducting 
detailed and comprehensive documentation reviews had to travel to where the files 
were located. As a result, the process of conducting risk assessments based on 
information of this types was extremely time-consuming and, accordingly, demanding 
of resources.  
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Difficulties obtaining information 
 
3.24 Social workers reported that they had well developed protocols for the sharing of 
information between them and the police. However information from other agencies 
was sometimes more difficult to access. For example, health professionals – such as 
GPs and psychiatrists – were said to be reluctant to give access to information that 
might be of value in informing assessments of risk. 
 
3.25 Neither witness statements nor the original court records were routinely available 
to inform risk assessments undertaken by different professionals, even though they 
could, if provided, supply important information about the circumstances of the 
offence and the demeanour of the offender at the time of its commission and could, 
therefore, make a vital contribution to the accurate assessment of risk.  In the case of 
forensic psychologists, whether or not witness statements were made available 
appeared to depend upon an individual’s link with Crown Office. However, as one 
psychologist observed, “…it shouldn’t be on a personal level. If you are working in 
the forensic service where you are doing a risk assessment on somebody it should be 
automatically available.”  
 
3.26 Social work respondents indicated that they sometimes received the indictment 
and the trial judge’s notes – both of which were extremely useful – but that this did 
not occur on a consistent basis. Social workers therefore reported that they would also 
welcome having access to witness statements, like their colleagues in the probation 
service in England and Wales. When considering whether there were any limitations 
imposed upon risk management strategies by the risk assessment tools employed, one 
social work respondent observed that “there’s not been consistent areas that have 
proved problematic to us, apart from available information.” Another respondent 
working in a forensic setting identified the lack of information about offending by 
young people under 16 years of age to be a problem18. 
 
3.27 Police respondents observed that the exchange of information on sex offenders 
who moved within Scotland was good – the entire file would be passed on to the 
police force in which the offender now resided – but that some English forces were 
reluctant to share full information about offenders who moved north of the border. 
This they attributed to court cases in England and Wales in which local authorities 
had been criticised for passing on information to another local authority when an 
offender moved address. The result was that the type of information provided was 
“down to each individual force or person”. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
3.28 Risk assessments were undertaken in a variety of contexts, including prisons 
community justice settings, secure and medium secure units and mental health in-
patient and out-patient facilities. Risk assessments informed risk management plans, 
helped inform multi-agency risk management strategies, assisted in the matching of 
                                                     
18 For instance, criminal records held by the Scottish Criminal Record Office do not usually contain 
details of children’s hearings appearances and outcomes. This makes it difficult to identify from these 
records whether or not a young person has a history of violent or sexual offending. 
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offenders to interventions and aided recommendations regarding release from prison, 
discharge from hospital or sentencing in court. 
 
3.29 Various professionals were involved in the completion and interpretation of risk 
assessments. They had, in most cases received training appropriate to this task and 
mechanisms appeared to be in place to quality assess the work. However, risk 
assessments usually were time-consuming and resource demanding and were 
sometimes constrained by external time frames. Moreover, respondents also identified 
important gaps in the availability of information to inform risk assessments, including 
witness statements and court records. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
4.1 As Kemshall (2002) observes in her review of current issues associated with the 
assessment and management of risk among serious violent and sexual offenders, 
different risk assessment tools have been shown to have particular strengths and 
weaknesses: for a detailed discussion of these the reader is referred to that review and 
to Cooke (2000). In this chapter the perceived strengths and weaknesses of different 
approaches to risk assessment in practice are examined.  First, however, the reasons 
why different agencies and professional groups adopted particular tools or particular 
approaches to risk assessment are discussed. 
 
 
REASONS FOR ADOPTING PARTICULAR APPROACHES TO RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
 
4.2 Respondents were asked in the audit questionnaire to indicate the reasons that 
their organisation had opted to use the particular risk assessment tool to which the 
audit return referred. The relevant responses are summarised in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Reasons for adopting risk assessment tools 
 
Reason Social 
Work 
(n=65)19 
Police 
(n=14)20 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=96) 
Ease of administration/scoring 35 1 7 3 45 
Ability to identify risk of harm 27 7 5 2 41 
Ability to identify risk of sexual 
offending 
 
22 
 
9 
 
6 
 
2 
 
39 
Known accuracy of the tool 28 - 7 3 38 
Knowledge of its use in other 
locations 
 
28 
 
2 
 
5 
 
3 
 
38 
Ability to identify risk of violent 
offending 
 
19 
 
- 
 
9 
 
3 
 
31 
To ensure compatibility with 
other agencies 
 
20 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
31 
Cost 5 - 7 - 12 
Other  18 3 1 1 23 
 
4.3 The factors most commonly said to lie behind the choice of tool were: the ease 
with which the tool could be administered and/or scored; the ability of the tool to 
identify risk of harm; and the ability of the tool to identify the risk of sexual 
offending. Cost, by contrast, was least often indicated as being a factor that had 
encouraged adoption of a particular tool by an organisation.  
 
4.4 The reasons for choosing particular risk assessment tools varied somewhat among 
the different professional groups. The factors accorded greater prominence by social 
workers were ease of use, known accuracy of the tool and knowledge of the tool’s use 
                                                     
19 Data were missing in two cases. 
20 Data were missing in one case. 
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in other locations. Police, on the other hand, emphasised the ability of the tool to 
identify risk of sexual offending and risk of harm. Tools employed by prison 
psychologists were most often chosen because of their ability to predict risk of 
violence, their ease of administration, known accuracy and cost.  
 
4.5 Psychologists were most attracted to tools – such as the PCL-R and HCR 20 - that 
had been validated and for which Scottish norms were available.  As one prison-based 
psychologist explained: 
 
“… they are well-researched and they work and I think they are tools 
that everyone agrees measure what they are meant to measure.” 
 
A further advantage of the use of standardised tools was, according to this respondent, 
the opportunity they afforded for a consistent approach to decision making, thereby 
ensuring that all prisoners were treated in a similar way. 
 
4.6 Given that the nature of the tools being used varied enormously, it is instructive to 
consider also the reasons underlying the choice of particular tools. Clearly this is not 
possible with many of the tools being used, since they were only included in the audit 
on one or two occasions. Instead, the comparison focuses upon the four most widely 
used tools. The police-developed risk assessment procedures have been included 
since, although they differed slightly from force to force, they represented a common 
underlying approach to the assessment of risk. The relevant data are presented in 
Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Reason for adopting particular tools 
 
Reason RAGF 
(n=24) 
LSI-R  
(n=20) 
Police 
RA 
(n=11) 
Matrix 
2000 
(n=6) 
Ease of administration/scoring 9 13 1 3 
Ability to identify risk of harm 16 3 7 1 
Ability to identify risk of sexual offending 9 - 9 5 
Known accuracy of the tool 2 16 - 5 
Knowledge of its use in other locations 9 11 1 2 
Ability to identify risk of violent offending 11 2 - 5 
To ensure compatibility with other agencies 10 8 5 2 
Cost 1 1 - 2 
Other  7 8 2 - 
 
 
4.7 The RAGF was most commonly selected because of its ability to predict risk of 
harm, its ability to identify risk of violent offending and its compatibility with 
approaches adopted by other agencies.  In only two cases, however, was its adoption 
said to have been influenced by its known accuracy in predicting risk. A key factor in 
the use of RAGF was its introduction and assumed support by the Scottish Executive, 
with some local authorities having participated as pilot areas for its use: 
 
“The fact that the Scottish Executive issued, and therefore by implication 
endorsed, the framework.” 
 
“This tool was adopted as a result of guidance (Red Book) issued by the 
Scottish Executive.” 
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“RA1-3 was introduced by the Executive and we adopted it as the central 
government advice on risk assessment.”  
 
4.8 Another reason given for adoption of the RAGF was the fact that it helped to 
structure the risk assessment process and assisted practitioners to justify risk decisions 
they had reached: 
 
“Rather than the tool’s ‘ability’ to identify, it assists practitioners to 
think clearly through the risk assessment process and ‘justify’ the 
assessment which they have reached.” 
 
4.9 LSI-R on the other hand, had most often been selected for use because of its 
known accuracy, its ease of administration and knowledge of its use in other 
locations. Other reasons for opting to use the LSI-R included its ability to assist in 
gate-keeping and the targeting of resources, its ability to inform action plans, its 
positive reputation and, related to most of these factors, its ability both to predict risk 
of recidivism and to identify criminogenic needs. For example: 
 
“LSI-R helps this department target its resources more appropriately to 
those whose need is greatest.” 
 
“Ability to identify criminogenic needs as well as likelihood of re-
offending.” 
 
“To provide a tool to assist in gate-keeping. We use LSI-R as an 
indication of the appropriate level of intervention.” 
 
“Measures both static and dynamic risk factors. Believed to be a 
forerunner in field.” 
 
4.10 The cost of the LSI-R was, however, viewed as a disincentive by social work 
respondents, especially since a cheaper alternative – in the form of the RAGF - was 
available: 
 
“LSI-R is being used pretty widely and we have had a lot of training in 
it and are fairly confident using it. That is not to say we think it is the 
best, but probably up there with the ones that are most efficient. None 
of them are perfect in any way. We have kind of questioned if we should 
use them for the cost, as it is pretty expensive to keep buying all the 
forms. So we have contemplated if we should shift to using OGRS or 
OASys or RA 1-4 because they are cheaper. The Scottish Executive are 
not pushing very strongly for one or the other so we are left with a 
judgement call in terms of the one we feel most comfortable with.”  
 
“Well, we got this guidance from the Scottish Executive so rather than 
pay a pound a sheet for LSI-R…”  
 
4.11 Known accuracy and ability to predict risk of sexual and violent offending most 
often encouraged agencies to adopt Matrix 2000, while their ability to predict risk of 
sexual offending and risk of harm most often lay behind the choice of risk assessment 
procedures adopted by the police. One officer explained, however, that the current 
approach to risk assessment was likely to be an interim measure: 
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“Risk assessment form adopted until a recognised/tested system has been 
identified which will fulfil the needs of the organisation.” 
 
4.12 The Tay Project had decided to develop their own tool – drawing upon research 
by Hanson and Thornton - since they did not feel that existing tools covered the range 
of relevant risk factors. Although David Thornton had subsequently developed Matrix 
2000, which incorporated dynamic risk factors, project staff did not feel comfortable 
using it on account of its complexity and lack of ease of administration. As one 
interviewee commented, “it’s not user-friendly. It’s almost like an academic 
experience rather than like a risk assessment.” 
 
4.13 The project staff were confident that their tool was reasonably effective in 
helping to allocate offenders to categories of risk, on the basis that the resulting score 
was usually congruent with the worker’s subjective impression. Similarly, the 
proportions of offenders falling into each category on the basis of risk assessments 
informed by the tool appeared appropriate. Staff reported that where there appeared to 
be some discrepancy between professional judgement and the categorisation resulting 
from the tool, the scoring would be double-checked using RRASOR or Matrix 2000. 
 
4.14 The Scottish prison Service had also given consideration to the use of locally 
developed tools such as the Tay Project risk assessment instrument but decided 
against its adoption because of its lack of validation. As one prison respondent 
explained: 
 
“It didn’t seem to us to have any merit in that it wasn’t validated in any 
way and no research had been carried out into its effectiveness. It 
wasn’t standardised in its operation.” 
 
The staff at the Tay Project were acutely aware of the need for the tool to be assessed 
and validated but considered this task to be beyond their ability. They were keen that 
the TAYPREP-30 should be validated externally and any necessary improvements 
made to enhance its predictive ability. 
 
Defensible decision-making 
 
4.15 A number of respondents in interview emphasised how their choice of risk 
assessment tools or approaches had been driven by a need to engage in defensible 
decision-making: that is, the ability to back up risk assessment decisions with 
empirically based evidence.  For example, one police officer commented that the 
police had been scrutinising the Tay Project risk assessment tool for possible adoption 
“basically to give as a more defensible position”. Another police respondent 
explained the position more fully: 
 
“We have quickly come to the conclusion after a wee while of working 
with it [police risk assessment procedure], realising that if we were 
called into question, if we were asked to go to court and give an 
account of why we had come up with this risk grading it would only be 
based on opinion and, as you know, in a court of law opinion doesn’t 
stand for anything…. We have realised for some time now that we need 
something that is accredited or backed up by some sort of research and 
we are currently looking at the Tay Project.” 
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4.16 Social work respondents similarly believed that a more structured approach to 
risk assessment promoted defensible decision-making. The ability to make defensible, 
transparent decisions also lay behind the approach to risk assessment that had been 
adopted by the Scottish Prison Service.  Risk assessments had to be completed for 
mandatory and discretionary life sentence prisoners who were having their tariffs – 
that is the ‘punishment’ part of the sentence - set by the courts. Those who had 
already served in excess of the ‘tariff’ would be referred to a tribunal who would 
decide, on the basis of a risk assessment, whether the prisoner could be released or 
should continue to be detained. Risk assessments therefore needed to be evidence-
based, employing the best available tools that had, ideally, been validated against a 
Scottish or other UK population.  
 
 
PERCEIVED STRENGTHS OF THE TOOLS 
 
4.17 The perceived strengths of the risk assessment tools employed by different 
professional groups are summarised in Table 4.3 and the perceived relative strengths 
of different tools are presented in Table 4.4. These data are based upon audit 
responses but the issues generated were also explored in interviews.  
 
Table 4.3: Perceived strengths of the tools referred to in audit returns 
 
Strength Social 
Work 
(n=67)21 
Police 
(n=14)22 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=98) 
Ease of administration/scoring 40 3 8 2 53 
Ability to identify risk of harm 34 6 4 2 46 
Widely used in other agencies 34 2 5 1 42 
Ability to identify risk of sexual 
offending 
 
23 
 
10 
 
5 
 
2 
 
40 
Enables compatibility with other 
agencies 
 
26 
 
7 
 
4 
 
2 
 
39 
Known accuracy of the tool 27 - 8 1 38 
Ability to identify risk of violent 
offending 
 
25 
 
- 
 
9 
 
3 
 
37 
Cost 11 - 8 - 19 
Other  12 2 1 1 16 
 
                                                     
21 Data were missing in one case. 
22 Data were missing in one case. 
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4.18 The most commonly perceived strength of the tools used by social workers was 
their ease of administration, their ability to predict risk of harm and the fact that they 
were widely used in other agencies. Police officers, on the other hand, identified their 
ability to identify risk of sexual offending and risk of harm and their compatibility 
with the risk assessments undertaken by other agencies the main strengths of their 
approaches to risk assessment. Prison psychologists most often viewed the strengths 
of the tools they used as their ease of administration, known accuracy and ability to 
predict risk of violent offending.  
 
Table 4.4: Perceived strengths of particular tools 
 
Strengths RAGF 
(n=25) 
LSI-R  
(n=20) 
Police 
RA 
(n=11) 
Matrix 
2000 
(n=6) 
Ease of administration/scoring 13 14 1 4 
Ability to identify risk of harm 19 4 6 1 
Widely used in other agencies 16 16 1 2 
Ability to identify risk of sexual offending 10 - 9 5 
Enables compatibility with other agencies 13 10 6 2 
Known accuracy of the tool 4 16 - 3 
Ability to identify risk of violent offending 13 5 - 4 
Cost 6 1 - 2 
Other  3 4 2 - 
 
4.19 Just as different risk assessment tools had been adopted for different reasons, so 
were they perceived by audit respondents as possessing differing strengths. Its ability 
to identify risk of harm, its wide use in other agencies, its ease of use, its 
compatibility with other risk assessment procedures and its ability to predict violent 
offending were viewed as the main strengths of the RAGF. RAGF was also viewed by 
social work respondents as assisting professional judgements of risk and encouraging 
a more structured approach to assessment and case planning: 
 
“Assists and records basis for professional judgements. Records risk 
factors and analysis based on them.” 
 
“Enables/encourages social workers to assess and implement action 
plans in a more structured way.” 
 
4.20 The most commonly identified strengths of the LSI-R were its known predictive 
ability with respect to re-offending, its wide use in other agencies and its ease of 
administration and/or scoring. Through its attention to both need and risk, LSI-R was 
said to assist in the targeting of criminal justice social work services and it was also 
believed to encourage greater consistency in assessment.  
 
“Ability to identify risk of reconviction and link to appropriate services.” 
 
“Increased consistency in SER (Social Enquiry Report) standards. 
Efficient resource allocation.” 
 
4.21 The strength of the LSI-R was not seen, on the other hand to lie in its ability to 
predict risk of harm or risk of sexual or violent offending. Matrix 2000, however, was 
believed to be good at predicting risk of sexual offending and violent offending and 
was considered by some respondents to be relatively easy to use. The police risk 
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assessment procedures were considered good at assessing risk of sexual offending and 
risk of harm and were believed to be compatible with approaches to risk assessment 
in use in other agencies. A further strength of these procedures was thought to be their 
ability to combine a variety of information from a range of relevant agencies and 
engender common ownership of the resulting risk assessments and risk management 
plans: 
 
“Risk assessment contains information obtained from all agencies 
having involvement with the subject and is a signed document agreed 
between the agencies.” 
 
4.22 The HCR-20, SVR-20 and PCL-R, by measuring both dynamic and static risk 
factors, were said by those who used them to provide a sound basis for developing 
risk management plans. They were also perceived as having the advantage of being 
applicable in a multi-disciplinary context. HCR-20 and PCL-R were also said to have 
the advantage of being widely known and, therefore, providing for a common 
understanding across within and across disciplinary groups. HCR 20 and SVR 20 
were said to be well structured for use in interviews and resulting risk assessment 
reports. These tools, and the PCLR, were also reported have good validity and 
reliability (see Kemshall, 2002).  
 
4.23 HCR20, in particular, was believed by those who used it to encourage a focus on 
risk management both in the short and longer term: 
 
“We are not just saying ‘this guy is high risk, just leave him’, we are 
actually saying ‘okay, this guy is high risk at the moment, this is how 
you can manage it so you can lower his risk’. That’s good for us from a 
professional point of view.” 
 
4.24 Other psychological risk assessment tools – such as the VRS and VRSSO – were 
viewed as having fewer strengths than those just described, but they had an additional 
advantage insofar as they were able to identify where an offender was placed in terms 
of their motivation to change.  
 
4.25 The SPS risk assessment strategy was thought by managers and psychologists to 
encourage a more focused approach that nonetheless yielded a considerable amount of 
relevant information. It was also said to promote a more standardised approach to risk 
assessment, which ensured that all prisoners were treated the same way. One 
psychologist succinctly summarised its perceived strengths as follows: 
 
“Consistency between raters, use of evidence based materials, 
transparency in decision-making, fairness to prisoners who can see 
why decisions are being made and when they are being made.” 
 
4.26 The TAYPREP-30 was described both by project staff and by police officers as 
being user-friendly and easy to use after some training.  Project staff believed that it 
tended to encourage a more consistent approach to the assessment of sex offender risk 
and ensured that workers gave consideration to a wide range of risk factors. Precisely 
because it covered all the relevant dynamic factors, project staff believed that it was 
particularly useful for informing risk management strategies 
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PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES OF THE TOOLS 
 
4.27 The risk assessment tools in use in Scotland were also perceived to have a 
number of weaknesses. These are shown in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5: Perceived weaknesses of the tools referred to in audit returns 
 
Weakness Social 
Work 
(n=62) 
Police 
(n=14) 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=3) 
Total 
(n=91) 
Predictive accuracy uncertain 24 9 2 1 36 
Inability to identify risk of sexual 
offending 
 
26 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
27 
Not widely used in other agencies 13 4 6 1 24 
Inability to identify risk of harm 15 - - - 15 
Inability to identify risk of violent 
offending 
 
12 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12 
Difficult to administer and/or score 9 2 1 - 12 
Not compatible with tools used in 
other agencies 
 
8 
 
1 
 
- 
 
1 
 
10 
Cost 6 - - - 6 
Other 11 6 - 2 19 
 
4.28 Some of the standardised tools in use in health settings (such as the PCL-R and 
HCR-20) were said to be limited by the absence of normative data from samples of 
Scottish in-patients. For this reason, their effectiveness with mentally disordered 
offenders was unknown.  In the case of the tools employed by prison based 
psychologists, the main disadvantage was perceived to be their limited use in other 
agencies and, hence, the absence of a common basis for risk assessment. The cost of 
training staff in the use of standardised instruments was also said to be high. The 
police risk assessment procedures were also viewed as limited because they differed 
from the approaches used by other agencies but they were most often criticised for 
their lack of validation and unknown predictive accuracy. The risk assessment tools 
employed by social workers were said to possess a number of weaknesses including 
their inability to predict risk of sexual offending, their lack of validation, their 
inability to predict risk of harm and their inability to predict violent offending.  
 
4.29 The perceived weaknesses of different risk assessment tools are summarised in 
Table 4.6. In addition to their unknown predictive accuracy, the police risk 
assessment procedures were thought by one respondent to be insufficiently objective: 
 
“Is very heavily dependent on personal judgement, with unclear 
guidance how to assess clinical and actuarial factors.” 
 
However there was also some reluctance among the police interviewees to adopt 
Matrix 2000 – the tools being used by some police forces in England and Wales – 
because, while it might provide an indication of risk level, it was regarded as less 
useful for informing risk management plans. 
 
4.30 The lack of a consistent approach between forces and between different agencies 
was also believed by police to be a weakness of the risk assessment procedures they 
adopted: 
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“Many sex offenders move frequently and there is no general police risk 
assessment format throughout Scotland.” 
 
“Weaknesses are found where an offender moves from our area from 
outside and the previous criminal justice team from another local 
authority use their own tool for risk assessment.” 
 
4.31 One social work respondent, who regularly liaised with the police over the 
management of sex offenders, expressed some concern that the relatively 
unstructured approach to risk assessment might result in the exaggeration of offender 
risk. In other words, people might be categorised as high risk on the basis of what 
they might do in the future rather than on the risk that they currently present. 
 
Table 4.6: Perceived weaknesses of particular tools 
 
Weakness RAGF 
(n=22) 
LSI-R  
(n=20) 
Police 
RA 
(n=11) 
Matrix 
2000 
(n=6) 
Predictive accuracy uncertain 17 1 7 - 
Inability to identify risk of sexual offending 7 17 - - 
Not widely used in other agencies 3 - 2 3 
Inability to identify risk of harm - 12 - - 
Inability to identify risk of violent offending 1 9 - - 
Difficult to administer and/or score 5 1 1 2 
Not compatible with tools used in other agencies 4 - - 2 
Cost - 6 - - 
Other 4 3 5 1 
 
 
4.32 RAGF was criticised primarily for its unknown ability to accurately predict risk 
and, to a lesser extent, for its inability to identify the risk of sexual offending. Other 
concerns about the RAGF included the fact that it was time-consuming to complete, 
ran the risk of being insufficiently objective and did not produce an overall ‘score’ to 
indicate the offender’s level of risk. One social work respondent also thought there 
was a possibility that workers using the RAGF might underestimate risk as a means of 
workload management. For example: 
 
“Staff find initial risk of harm repetitive. ‘Automatic High Risk’ list is too 
wide. RA4 is too long and repetitive and still needs a risk management 
plan at the end of it.” 
 
“Can be subjective if administrator is either over simplistic or over 
pragmatic.” 
 
“Lack of a points system means a reliance on social workers’ judgement, 
but this can be positive too.” 
 
4.33 The main drawbacks of the LSI-R were perceived to be its inability to identify 
risk of sexual offending, risk of violent offending and risk of harm and its cost. Other 
less commonly mentioned weaknesses included the perception that it is overly 
prescriptive and can disadvantage people from deprived backgrounds, its tendency to 
replicate what is already gleaned from the interview, its use of confusing language 
(e.g. double negatives) and the absence of validation against a Scottish sample. One 
social work respondent also observed that the significance of the resulting score might 
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vary widely between rural and urban areas.  Most concern, however, centred upon the 
limited value of the LSI-R with particular groups of offenders, notably those who are 
the focus of this report: 
 
“The tool is of limited value in work with sexual offenders and most 
serious violent offenders.” 
 
Does not specifically address violent behaviour and should not be used 
with sexual offending. Caution must be used. Does not identify risk of 
harm.” 
 
4.34 The VRAG was suggested by interview respondents to be limited because of its 
purely actuarial nature and its lack of attention to dynamic risk factors. However 
some psychologists questioned how ‘objective’ some of the more favoured structured 
clinical measures – such as the PCR-L – actually were, stressing the importance of 
these tools serving as an aid to clinical assessment rather than replacing it: 
 
“I think if, as a service, we think it [PCLR] is an absolute, reliable, 
hard tool then we are slipping up. It should augment your clinical 
practice, not replace it.” 
 
4.35 Because most tools require an element of judgement, some respondents also saw 
the potential for a lack of consistency in the administration and interpretation of 
structured clinical tools, either within or between professional groups. For instance, 
one prison psychologist explained: 
 
“…other people through in health, for example, or mental health 
tended not to stick to the format, so it’s easy in may ways for the format 
to be shifted or to be modified… [different professionals] come from 
different theoretical bases and although they try to adopt a 
psychological theoretical basis or orientation, it actual fact it becomes 
quite skewed and quite changed.” 
 
4.36 One weakness perceived to be associated with the PCL-R was not inherent to the 
tool itself, but rather concerned how others interpreted the scores derived from it. A 
high score on the PCL-R, for example, tended to lead to stereotyping and a diversion 
of attention away from risk management issues. As one psychologist explained: 
 
“If you give someone a score that is high on the PCL-R, then you have 
immediately given them this kind of label of psychopathy which sends 
everyone a bit sky high. Everyone has got that great Hollywood image 
of Anthony Hopkins in Silence of the Lambs. You have lost them – they 
stop looking at risk management at that point.”  
 
4.37 One psychologist also suggested that there was too much reliance upon 
psychological risk assessment tools that could only be administered by trained 
forensic psychologists and psychiatrists and that this could also limit the level of 
multi-disciplinary involvement in risk management plans. Instead, s/he suggested, 
initial screening could be undertaken with a general risk measure such as LSI-R, 
which could be employed by and understood by a wider range of professional groups.  
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IDENTIFYING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF RISK 
 
4.38 There was a view among social work respondents that existing tools is use were 
useful for providing a general indication of risk level but that they needed to be 
supplemented by clinical judgement, particularly since some types of offenders were 
not adequately ‘covered’ by existing tools.  
 
4.39 Psychologists saw the strengths of the tools they employed less in terms of their 
ability to assign offenders to different levels of risk, but more in terms of their ability 
to help identify offenders’ risk management needs. For example one respondent 
commented, “it’s not important if they are low, medium or high: it is about how you 
manage it” while another suggested that “it is more about hazard identification and 
hazard situation management”. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
4.40 Tools had most often been adopted for use in risk assessments on account of the 
ease with which they could be administered and/or scored, their ability to identify risk 
of harm and their ability to identify the risk of sexual offending. Social workers were 
more likely to use tools that were relatively easy to administer while psychologists 
were attracted to tools that had been validated, particularly if normative data for 
Scotland were available. One specialist project had developed its own tool which, 
although it had not been validated, was being considered for national adoption by the 
police.  
 
4.41 A primary consideration for all professional groups in their approach to risk 
assessment was the ability to make defensible decisions backed up by appropriate 
tools. Different tools and approaches were perceived to have different strengths, 
however their ability to inform risk management plans was considered critical. 
Weakness associated with different tools included their complexity, their lack of 
objectivity, their lack of validation and their inability to measure the specific risks 
associated with the types of offenders who are the subject of this report.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
5.1 As the discussion towards the end of Chapter Four indicated, risk assessment is 
not and end it itself but should, rather, be a means for informing strategies for 
managing offender risk. In this Chapter audit responses and interviews are drawn 
upon to examine how risk assessments undertaken by different professional groups 
are used to inform risk management plans and strategies. This analysis identifies 
issues associated with the management of risk in the transition from one setting to 
another and concludes, in particular, by considering some of the issues raised in 
respect of the management of mentally disordered offenders in their transition from 
prison/hospital to the community.  
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
5.2 Whilst at one level risk assessment was viewed by some social work respondents 
as a mechanism for assisting in resource allocation, there was universal agreement 
across the various professional groups who where interviewed that the most important 
purpose of the risk assessment was the development of a risk management plan: 
 
“Largely speaking it is so we can manage risk appropriately both in 
terms of what kind of services people get should they get on statutory 
orders and also to look at the general risk management strategy that we 
would need to undertake.” (Social work respondent) 
 
“Assessment is also used to plan risk management strategies – 
identifying what we can do now and also to make plans for the future.” 
(Health respondent) 
 
“…the most important reasons from my point of view would be to 
generate a risk management plan. I see risk assessment as a way of 
developing a course of action rather than a risk assessment as such.” 
(Prison respondent) 
 
5.3 As was indicated previously, each of the professional groups who participated in 
the audit regarded their contribution to risk management as the most prominent 
purpose of the risk assessment tools. Given the importance of managing the risk 
presented by serious violent and sexual offenders, the audit questionnaire also sought 
information about the manner in which risk assessment tools inform risk management 
strategies within organisations. The resulting data are summarised in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. How the tools referred to in the audit were used to inform risk management strategies 
 
Contribution made by tool Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=14)23 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=98) 
Identify risk factors to be reduced 
through programme provision 
 
57 
 
4 
 
9 
 
4 
 
74 
Identify the level of monitoring or 
surveillance required 
 
45 
 
14 
 
10 
 
5 
 
74 
Identify the likely impact of the risk 
should it occur 
 
37 
 
11 
 
4 
 
4 
 
56 
Inform decisions about conditions to be 
attached to orders or licences 
 
41 
 
3 
 
7 
 
2 
 
53 
Inform the role of different 
professionals in risk management 
 
31 
 
8 
 
4 
 
2 
 
48 
Inform decisions about how any 
conditions should be enforced 
 
28 
 
4 
 
5 
 
4 
 
38 
Other 3 - - - 3 
 
 
5.4 The risk assessment tools included in the audit were said in most returns (94) to 
inform risk management strategies. In only four returns (each of which pertained to 
tools used by social workers) were the resulting risk assessments said not to 
contribute to risk management24.  As Table 5.1 indicates, risk assessment tools were 
most often said to contribute to risk management by identifying risk factors to be 
reduced through the provision of appropriate programmes of intervention and by 
identifying the level of monitoring or supervision of the offender that was required.  
 
5.5 The manner in which the results of risk assessments informed risk management 
strategies varied from agency to agency. For instance, risk assessments conducted by 
the police were most commonly used to identify the level of monitoring or 
surveillance required or the likely impact of the risk (i.e. the likely harm that would 
be caused) should it occur.  
 
5.6 The police risk assessments categorised sexual offenders as high, medium or low 
risk. This risk classification, in turn, determined how frequently offenders were 
visited by the police as part of their risk management plan. As one police respondent 
explained: 
 
“If it is a low risk offender, then we would only visit them once a year. A 
medium risk offender, then a couple of times a year. High risk, then a 
minimum of every three months. If they are really high risk when we do it 
then we will visit them daily or weekly. That doesn’t go on forever as it’s 
very resource intensive. But initially, if we have got problems with 
someone or if they are just out they might get daily or weekly visits.” 
 
5.7 Police risk assessments were essentially used, therefore, to determine the intensity 
of monitoring of sex offenders. As one officer explained, even though they had been 
given statutory responsibility for managing the risk presented by sex offenders in the 
community, the police had, in practice, limited powers under the Sex Offenders Act 
1997 and were therefore constrained in terms of how they might implement risk 
management strategies: 
                                                     
23 Data were missing in one case. 
24 Data were missing in one case. 
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“The level of risk when it is eventually arrived at will determine how 
often we will visit offenders at their home to try and monitor them, to 
make sure they are still staying at the address they have told us they 
are at. In effect that is the only thing we can really do by law. As I say, 
they are not even required to comply with the risk assessment process 
under the Sex Offenders Act.” 
 
5.8 Risk assessments undertaken by prison psychologists most often aided decisions 
about the level of monitoring required, identified factors to be addressed through 
participation in prisoner programmes and informed decisions about whether and what 
conditions should be attached to parole or non-parole licences. As one prison 
psychologist explained, the purpose of risk assessments was: 
 
“To look at what interventions you can put in place in terms of 
programmes and things but also how much support and where they can 
get support from on their release.” 
 
5.9 Risk assessments conducted on offenders with mental health problems usually 
contributed to decisions about monitoring and the enforcement of any conditions 
attached to orders or licences, identified an appropriate focus for programmes of 
intervention and provided information about the likely impact of the risk. In the 
prison and hospital settings, risk assessments were also used to inform decisions 
about progression and release. For example: 
 
“… [if] their last assault on a member of staff … [was] premeditated 
that makes a big difference to how we might look to place that person 
in the community or whether or not they leave here.” 
 
5.10 The risk assessment tools used by social workers most often were employed to 
provide information about the nature of risk factors to be addressed through structured 
intervention with the offender and to identify the level of monitoring or surveillance 
required. They were also said to be drawn upon to inform decisions about whether 
and what conditions should be attached to court orders or licences and to provide 
information about the risk of harm. Each of the professional groups also regarded the 
risk assessment tools they used as informing the role of different professionals in the 
risk management process, with social workers and the police most likely to utilise 
them in this way. 
 
 
OTHER INFORMATION INFORMING RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
5.11 The audit of risk tools indicated that other information was also drawn upon in 
the development of risk management plans.  Information derived from the tools would 
usually be supplemented by information from existing agency records (96 returns), by 
interviews with the offender (90 returns) and by information provided by other 
agencies, such as criminal records or offence details (87 returns).  
 
5.12 Most interviewees indicated that they would draw upon information other than 
that derived from risk assessment tools when developing risk management plans. 
These included local knowledge about offenders and information derived from case 
conferences involving a range of relevant agencies, such as social work (criminal 
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justice and child protection), police, housing etc. Police officers emphasised that they 
were willing to share information with all agencies involved in the management of 
sex offenders, whether in prison or in the community, but that they did so strictly on a 
need to know basis even among the police force itself. 
 
5.13 Psychologists in the State Hospital drew upon a wide variety of information 
including hospital and medical files, school reports, information from educational 
psychologists and social work files. It was, however, said sometimes to be difficult to 
get access to certain types of information and the process of doing so could be very 
time consuming.  
 
5.14 Prison psychologists were able to talk to other professionals who had contact 
with prisoners on a regular basis (such as personal officers, work party officers or 
social workers) to garner further information about a prisoner’s behaviour and 
demeanour and to verify statements made by the prisoner. As one respondent noted, 
“the principle I’d work on is don’t necessarily believe what they tell you until you can 
check it out for yourself.” 
 
5.15 Prison psychologists also undertook collateral file reviews to inform risk 
assessments and risk management plans for individual prisoners, but in doing so were 
able to draw only upon information that was in the public domain. Information 
included in the prisoner’s warrant file alone could be included in the risk assessment 
report, though potentially relevant information – for example the fact that a prisoner 
was taking psychotropic medicine - was not always placed in the warrant file. It was 
also suggested that prisoners’ files might contain conflicting accounts of offences or 
events from different professionals, making it difficult to establish the true version of 
what occurred. 
 
5.16 In addition to the information routinely made available in warrant files, prison 
psychologists suggested that a range of other information would be of value in 
informing risk assessments. This included witness statements, social work records, 
medical files and psychiatric notes, though it was recognised that some of these 
sources could have their limitations by being based primarily upon information 
provided by the prisoner  
 
5.17 Some social workers highlighted problems regarding access to information held 
by other agencies, especially detailed information about the offence. For example: 
 
“There is the ongoing difficulty about obtaining ‘full’ offence details 
from the PF.” 
 
“It is important to obtain as much information as possible. However as 
you will be aware we receive very little information re the actual offence. 
This is required for good risk assessments.” 
 
5.18 Another social worker highlighted how a range of information was drawn 
together in the context of multi-agency risk management: 
 
“Most risk management planning is carried out in multi-agency case 
conferences involving criminal justice and child protection social work, 
police, housing, education (if appropriate), vol. orgs. (if appropriate).” 
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5.19 In the Scottish Prison Service, multi-disciplinary risk management groups – 
consisting of prison managers, social workers ands psychologists – were being 
established in long-term prisons. Their purpose will be to consider initial needs/risk 
assessments, to decide whether a more detailed psychological risk assessment is 
required and to agree a risk management plan for the prisoner while in custody and in 
the transition to the community.  
 
5.20 Prison psychologists suggested that there was a tendency for the 
recommendations that flowed from risk assessments to be influenced by the 
availability of existing programmes and interventions rather than directly reflecting 
individual risks. An ongoing debate centred on the validity of recommending an 
intervention that was not available or, similarly, of assessing a condition – such as 
psychopathy – for which no treatment was available.  
 
5.21 Prison psychologists identified the transition from prison to the community as the 
main weakness in terms of risk management, particularly because the models of 
intervention employed by social workers in local authorities were different from those 
that underpinned prison based programmes. This made a seamless transition very 
difficult to achieve. 
 
 
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 
 
5.22 According to interviewees from forensic health settings, disagreement tended to 
occur between psychologists and psychiatrists with respect to the contribution that 
mental illness made to risk. One psychologist suggested that psychiatrists tended to 
adopt the view that if the person was no longer ill, they no longer presented a risk. On 
the other hand, psychologists were more concerned to look beyond the presenting 
mental health problems to determine why behaviour may have become manifest in 
particular ways. 
 
5.23 Another difficulty pertaining to the transition of mentally disordered offenders 
from secure settings to the community concerned a lack of clarity with respect to who 
was responsible for their supervision. It was suggested that social work departments 
were reluctant to assume responsibility for the supervision of offenders returned to the 
community who subject to forensic risk management orders. This meant that forensic 
social workers were expected to continue working with these offenders, and this had  
implications for the time they were able to devote to this and to other tasks. 
 
5.24 A forensic psychologist who was interviewed explained that the ability to manage 
mentally disordered offenders who presented a risk of serious violent or sexual 
offending was sometimes constrained by the legislative basis of treatment. For 
example, offenders transferred from the State Hospital were subject to Section 58 of 
the Criminal Procedures Act (a hospital order with restrictions) which meant that any 
restrictions imposed upon them were guided by risk assessments. In the cases of 
offenders referred for treatment under Section 18 of the Mental Health Act, on the 
other hand, when the compulsory element expired any contact with forensic or other 
services was on an informal basis, regardless of whether or not they continued to 
present a risk. As s/he explained: 
 
“The difficulty comes in with a Section 18, when you can only pull them 
back in for two periods of six months and thereafter they become 
 40 
informal and often people say they don’t want to see you anymore. Now 
we might think they are still at risk, but if they haven’t got the 
appropriate Section there is not a thing we can do about it.” 
 
5.25 Forensic psychologists also indicated that there were limited powers to recall 
serious violent or sexual offenders who were no longer mentally ill but who refused to 
engage with interventions aimed at addressing their offending behaviour. Offenders 
who became ill again or who were not taking their medication could be re-
hospitalised, but those who were not ill yet who still evidently posed a significant risk 
could not. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
5.26 Risk assessment was considered not as an end in itself, but as a means of 
informing risk management strategies and plans.  Risk assessments did this in various 
ways, but most often by identifying risk factors to be reduced through programme 
provision and, particularly in the case of the police, helping determine the level of 
monitoring or surveillance required.  
 
5.27 Those engaged in managing the risk presented by serious violent and sexual 
offenders usually drew upon a range of information from various sources, in addition 
to formal risk assessments, to develop and implement risk management plans.  
 
5.28 Particular difficulties were identified regarding the transition of prisoners from 
prison to the community and in respect of the management of mentally disordered 
offenders in the community. The latter, it was suggested, was constrained by 
legislative provision that prevented appropriate steps from being taken in some 
circumstances in which an offender was assessed as presenting a significant risk   
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CHAPTER SIX: MULTI-AGENCY RISK ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
6.1 As the discussion in Chapter Five will have made clear, effective risk 
management was considered by those who took part in the audit and in the interviews 
usually to require a co-ordinated, multi-agency approach (see also Maguire et al., 
2001). This chapter, therefore, considers the extent to which and ways in which 
different agencies were involved in the process of risk assessment and in the 
development and implementation of risk management plans. The chapter concludes 
by identifying the perceived strengths of a multi-disciplinary approach along with the 
factors that were perceived to hinder more effective multi-agency work. 
 
 
MULTI-AGENCY RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Use of risk assessment tools in multi-agency risk assessment 
 
6.2 Respondents who participated in the audit were asked to indicate how frequently 
risk assessment tools were employed in a multi-agency context. The resulting data are 
summarised in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Use of tools referred to in the audit in multi-agency risk assessments 
 
How often used in multi-
agency context 
Social 
Work 
(n=65) 
Police 
(n=13) 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=95) 
Always 8 7 4 1 20 
Usually 14 3 4 1 32 
Sometimes  29 2 3 2 36 
Never 14 1 1 1 17 
 
6.3 In around half of the returns the tools were reported as always or usually being 
used as part of a multi-agency risk assessment. In a similar proportion of returns they 
were said to be only sometimes or never employed in this way. Police officers and 
prison-based psychologists were more likely than social workers or health 
professionals to report that they regularly employed tools in a multi-agency context. 
 
6.4 There was also a tendency for specialist tools to be more often employed than 
generic risk assessment tools as part of a multi-agency risk assessment. In Table 6.2 
the various ‘specialist’ tools have been combined to facilitate comparison. Locally 
developed police risk assessment procedures were also used regularly as part of a 
multi-agency risk assessment. 
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Table 6.2: Frequency of use of different tools in multi-agency risk assessments 
 
How often used in multi-agency 
context 
RAGF  LSI-R Police RA  Specialist 
tools25 
Always 3 2 7 8 
Usually 7 2 2 6 
Sometimes 13 8 - 9 
Never 2 8 1 2 
 
 
Who is involved in multi-agency risk assessment? 
 
6.5 The range of other professionals involved in multi-agency risk assessments of 
serious violent and sexual offenders is summarised in Table 6.3.  The nature of other 
agencies involved in the risk assessment and management process will clearly differ 
according to the location of the offender (e.g. in prison, in the community, in a mental 
health setting). Amongst the sample of respondents in the audit survey (in which 
social workers were over-represented) the other agencies that were most often 
involved in multi-agency risk assessments were the police, housing agencies, 
psychiatrists and ‘other mental health professionals’. Staff from education 
departments were least likely to be involved in multi-agency risk assessments (or 
decisions flowing from them), presumably because their involvement (like those of 
other agencies) was on a ‘need to know’ basis.  
 
Table 6.3: Other agencies involved in multi-agency risk assessments involving the tools referred 
to in the audit 
 
Agency Social 
Work 
(n=67) 
Police 
(n=15) 
Prison 
(n=12) 
Health 
(n=5) 
Total 
(n=99) 
Police officers 43 - - 1 44 
Housing 31 7 - - 38 
Psychiatrists 20 3 7 3 33 
Other mental health 
professionals 
 
19 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
26 
Prison officers 13 2 8 2 25 
Social workers - 12 10 3 25 
Psychologists 15 3 - 2 20 
Psychiatric nurses 8 1 7 1 17 
Education 9 1 - 1 11 
Other 4 3 - - 7 
 
 
6.6 ‘Other’ agencies included the Parole Board, tribunal members, staff in secure 
accommodation and any other agency who might have information relevant to the 
assessment of offender risk: 
 
“Any agency / professional who has knowledge of the particular 
person.” 
 
“Anyone or any agency who / which has information to assist in the 
assessment process.” 
                                                     
25 Includes Matrix 2000, Tay Project Risk Assessment Tool, Static 99, SARA, HCR-20, RRASOR, 
PCL-R, SVR-20, VRS, VRS 50 and SOAQ. 
 43 
 
“In cases of high risk sex offenders assessments are shared amongst 
relevant individuals involved in our multi-disciplinary ‘Sex Offender 
Forum’.” 
 
6.7 Social workers did not generally conduct risk assessments jointly with other 
agencies, though information provided by other agencies often informed these 
assessments and the resulting risk management plans. As one respondent explained, 
“Other agencies are used for sources of information, they do not complete the 
assessment.” 
 
6.8 Social workers – including those in specialist projects - shared their risk 
assessments of sexual offenders with the police. In one area, however, joint visits for 
the purpose of assessing sex offenders were usually undertaken by social workers and 
police officers. This arrangement was perceived by the police respondent as more 
effective (in terms of information sharing) and more efficient (since it avoided 
duplication of effort).  
 
6.9 Staff in health settings were more likely to adopt a multi-agency approach to risk 
assessment, with staff from different professional groups assuming responsibility for 
relevant parts of the assessment (for example, nurses might be asked to examine a 
patient’s medical history or history of admissions). In the State Hospital there was an 
intention to move towards multi-disciplinary risk assessment though at present 
different elements of risk assessment were said to be being carried out independently 
of each other.   
 
6.10 In prisons, psychologists were responsible for undertaking risk assessments. 
However, as previously noted, Risk Management Groups were being established in 
long-term prisons to improve the targeting of detailed risk assessments. The Risk 
Management Groups – consisting of prison managers and officers, social workers and 
psychologists – would consider the information provided by the collateral file review 
and decide whether a full psychological risk assessment was required. The risk 
assessment would then be discussed by the multi-disciplinary team who would have 
an opportunity to feed into the resulting recommendation.  
 
6.11 The perceived advantages of this arrangement were that it provided psychologists 
with access to a wider range of information and perspectives and engendered a sense 
of ownership of risk management plans. The perceived disadvantages were that 
differences of opinion might arise and that some members of the group might have 
limited understanding of risk assessment and management, including the tools that are 
used.  
 
Issues arising from the use of the tools in multi-agency risk assessments 
 
6.12 A number of issues were identified from the audit returns, some of which 
pertained to the adequacy of individual instruments and some of which concerned 
their use in a multi-agency context. In general, views about multi-agency risk 
assessment were mixed, with some respondents indicating that it did not prove 
problematic. Overall, however, issues were said to have arisen in 30/78 returns in 
which the tool was reported to be employed as part of a multi-agency risk assessment 
process, with each of the professional groups indicating that difficulties of this type 
had been encountered (Table 6.4).  
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Table 6.4: Whether issues had arisen in the use of the tool in a multi-agency context 
 
Have issues arisen? Social 
Work 
(n=51) 
Police 
(n=12) 
Prison 
(n=11) 
Health 
(n=4) 
Total 
(n=78) 
Yes 15 6 7 2 30 
No 32 4 3 1 40 
Don’t know 4 2 1 1 8 
 
 
Table 6.5: Types of issues that have arisen in multi-agency risk assessment 
 
Issue Social 
Work 
(n=15) 
Police 
(n=6) 
Prison 
(n=7) 
Health 
(n=2) 
Total 
(n=30) 
Other agencies using different tools 13 6 5 2 26 
lack of agreement over interpretation 
of results 
10 2 4 1 17 
Lack of clarity as to how tool should 
inform risk management 
11 1 3 1 16 
Other 6 1 1 - 6 
 
6.13 The types of issues identified are summarised in Table 6.5. Respondents most 
often believed that difficulties had been created by the use of different tools by 
different professional groups. For example, as one social work respondent 
commented: 
 
“The [specialist project] have assessed sex offenders as medium risk 
when the case holder using RA1-4 assesses high risk. This can be 
confusing for the courts.” 
 
6.14 Respondents also indicated that there had sometimes arisen lack of agreement as 
to how to interpret the results. As one police officer observed: 
 
“Social work apply Thornton Risk Matrix 2000 for production of their 
assessment although all interviews are joint police/social work. 
Occasionally there is ‘disagreement’ on the assessed risk. All cases go 
before the Joint Scrutiny Board who recommend/confirm grading to be 
applied as well as management processes in respect of subject.” 
(original emphasis) 
 
6.15 In some cases respondents suggested that there had been a lack of clarity as to 
how the results should inform risk management strategies. As one mental health 
respondent explained, different agencies sometimes placed: 
 
“…different emphasis on importance of mental illness in contributing to 
risk assessment and management.” 
 
6.16 In addition to these shared concerns, some of the different professional groups 
who participated in the audit raised particular issues. Some social work respondents 
expressed some concern that if different tools were being used by different 
professional groups the same offender may be identified as presenting different levels 
of risk. One social work respondent also suggested that problems had arisen with 
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respect to disclosure, particularly in the context of joint police/social work risk 
assessments of sexual offenders.  
 
6.17 Police officers’ concerns centred on the fact that different risk assessment 
procedures were adopted by different forces and by different local authorities, 
creating particular difficulties when offenders moved from one part of the country to 
another. Multi-agency risk assessments were also thought by some police respondents 
to be hampered by the fact that police risk assessment procedures had not been 
validated and relied heavily upon professional judgement: structured tools such as 
Matrix 2000 or the Tay Project Assessment Tool would be welcomed but were not yet 
widely used. 
 
6.18 In practice, although they adopted different approaches to risk assessment, police 
and social workers’ assessments were said generally to be in accordance. Thus while 
the use of common tools might, in principle, reduce the potential for disagreement, 
this did not appear to be a salient concern. One of the challenges in developing a 
common approach to risk assessment would, it was suggested, be how the tool could 
be incorporated in a wider framework that met the specific information needs of the 
two organisations.  
 
6.19 The benefit of different agencies approaching risk assessment differently was 
thought by respondents in different professional groups to be that it enabled a wider 
range of information to be brought into a multi-disciplinary forum. However, 
instances were cited where different conclusions about risk had been reached by 
different professionals, usually because there had been no communication between 
them prior to the preparation of risk assessment reports.  
 
6.20 Discrepancies were also reported occasionally to have arisen when patients in the 
State Hospital hired independent psychologists to provide risk assessments because 
they were unhappy with the risk assessment carried out at Carstairs. Independent 
psychologists tended, it was suggested, to be less objective in their scoring and 
interpretation of risk assessment tools and to be inclined to produce more favourable 
risk assessment reports. 
 
A consistent approach to risk assessment? 
 
6.21 In their attempt to bring uniformity and a greater degree of structure to their risk 
assessments, the Scottish police forces were considering the adoption of the Tay 
Project’s risk assessment tool. In interview the police respondents expressed a clear 
preference for this tool over Matrix 2000 (which has been adopted by police forces in 
England and Wales). The former they believed was more comprehensive and was 
easier to use, though the fact that it had not yet been validated was recognised as a 
disadvantage. Social work respondents were also open to the possibility of adopting 
the TAYPREP-30, particularly if it was adopted nationally by the police, since this 
would allow for a more consistent approach to risk assessment by different agencies. 
 
6.22 Some respondents believed that there would be value in having a common 
approach to risk assessment across Scotland, though others were less convinced that 
this was necessary so long as whatever tools were being used provided the 
information required. As one social work respondent observed:  
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“It doesn’t particularly bother me what risk assessment it is as long 
as they’ve used something which encapsulates risk of re-offending, 
risk of harm, criminogenic needs, that sort of stuff.” 
 
6.23 Other social work respondents questioned whether it would be possible to have a 
standardised approach to risk assessment while different professional groups operated 
with different theoretical and value bases. Another stressed that using the same tool 
was not enough if the different agencies did not communicate adequately with each 
other. There was, however, some support for the development of a more standardised 
approach to the production of reports, with a consistent emphasis upon identifying 
risk factors and how different agencies might have a role in managing various risks. 
 
 
MULTI-AGENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
6.24 Social workers reported being involved with other agencies in risk management. 
These included the police, psychologists, psychiatrists and any other agencies that had 
a relevant input to make. Police officers would similarly involve other agencies in the 
management of offender risk, for example by informing education or housing 
departments if they believed that a particular offender’s behaviour suggested that they 
might pose a risk. 
 
6.25 In some parts of the country more formalised arrangements had been instituted 
for liaison between different agencies. In Edinburgh, for example, designated sex 
offender liaison officers – SOLOs - had been appointed by the police, social work and 
housing. This arrangement was said by the police to have greatly facilitated the 
exchange of information to manage sex offender risk.  
 
6.26 Psychologists in health settings were also keen to encourage multi-agency 
involvement in risk management since they reviewed this as essential for the effective 
management of risk. Within Carstairs, for example, risk management plans were 
reported to be shared between all relevant disciplines and information forwarded in 
the event of a patient being transferred to another institution.  
 
6.27 Another example of multi-agency risk management was described by the Tay 
Project, where a nurse co-ran the groups for sex offenders with learning disabilities. 
There were also plans in place for the sex offender registration officers from the local 
police force to share premises with the project to facilitate the sharing of information 
and their attendance at reviews. 
 
6.28 Prison personnel perceived the absence of a national framework for risk 
assessment by social workers as undermining the potential for effective risk 
management of prisoners once they returned to the community. A prison-based 
psychologist suggested that “if psychology is the lead agency in risk assessment, I 
think social work is the lead agency in risk management”. The potential for a 
‘seamless’ transition from prison to the community was also said by prison 
respondents to be undermined by the fact that similar programmes of intervention 
were not in place in the two settings, with the result that there was little continuity of 
provision when a prisoner was released.  
 
6.29 Within prisons, the nature and extent of multi-agency risk management between 
prison psychologists and other professionals appeared to vary across establishments. 
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At one level, a copy of the risk management plan would be placed in the prisoner’s 
warrant file and therefore be available to any other professionals who wished to 
access it26. At another level, other disciplines would be brought into a case if 
particular issues or difficulties arose. At a third level, one psychologists reported 
regularly involving prison and community-based social workers in discussions about 
the management of offenders’ risk and would have welcomed the opportunity for this 
to occur on a more formalised basis. 
 
6.30 Overall, therefore, different professional groups recognised the value of multi-
agency working and expressed willingness in principle to engage in it. As one prison 
psychologist explained: 
 
“If we were able to develop good written multi-disciplinary risk 
management plans that are short, medium and long term so that there 
are plans for within the establishment, plans for when someone leaves 
and that the targets are set for each professional within the multi-
agency group and those plans are reviewed as the prisoner 
progresses through the system – I think that would be a good way 
forward in terms of bringing in more disciplines into the risk 
management process.” 
 
6.31 At a practical level, however, there was acknowledged to be some way to go 
before different agencies adopted a common approach to risk assessment and 
management.  
 
Perceived advantages and disadvantages of multi-agency risk management 
 
6.32 Multi-agency risk management was seen as having a number of advantages. For 
example, it enabled the approach adopted to be tailored to the nature of the risks 
posed by the offender and it also served to spread responsibility for managing the 
offender’s behaviour across a number of agencies rather than it being the sole 
responsibility of one. As one social work respondent commented: 
 
“ I think it’s a rather brave person who would say that our agency 
can do it all… So I think there’s a bit of support.” 
 
6.33 A respondent from a specialist project suggested that the sharing of information 
among different professionals could provide a forum for obtaining feedback about 
how effective various elements of the programme had been and could also help 
communicate a message to offenders that their behaviour was being closely 
scrutinised. A similar point was made by a police respondent as follows: 
 
“Most high risk offenders are well aware that we do sit down and 
discuss them with everybody… Particularly your older offenders are 
well aware that police and social work did not work well together in 
the past or got on that well. They are now under the impression, quite 
rightly, that we now work closely. They realise we sit down and talk 
about them.” 
 
                                                     
26 Though how easily they were able to understand and make use of the information contained in it is, 
perhaps, another matter. 
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6.34 In principle, therefore, respondents viewed multi-agency involvement in risk 
management as something to be encouraged. However, some disadvantages, which 
might undermine an effective partnership approach to the management of serious 
violent and sexual offenders, were also identified. They can be summarised as:  
 
• Some agencies having to assume responsibility for a disproportionate amount of 
the work. 
 
• If sensitive information is going to be shared with other agencies on a need to 
know basis, they need to be trusted to deal with it appropriately and not to over-
react.   
 
• The practical difficulties involved in getting all the relevant parties together, 
especially when a large number of agencies might be involved27.  
 
• Lack of agreement about the risk presented and resources required in a particular 
case, possibly as a result of different agencies placing differing emphases on 
issues. 
 
• Obtaining information from health services as a result of issues around patient 
confidentiality, though in some areas local protocols have been developed. 
 
• While the sharing of information between social workers and the police was 
generally good, social workers occasionally omitted to pass information on. 
 
• Lack of agreement as to who should contribute what in terms of funding of risk 
management strategies. 
 
• Different agencies having different priorities. 
 
• Other agencies’ lack of knowledge and understanding of issues relating to sex 
offenders (e.g. community care workers who were said often to have little 
awareness of the issues presented by sexual offenders with learning disabilities). 
 
6.35 Multi-disciplinary working required mutual trust and could in some 
circumstances result in the blurring of professional boundaries. As one respondent, 
who worked in a multi-disciplinary team in a health setting explained, “it is 
sometimes shocking when a person from another discipline volunteers to or is asked 
to take on a piece of work that is another discipline’s”. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
6.36 There was a general recognition, among those who participated in the research, of 
the value of a multi-agency approach to risk assessment and, in particular, to risk 
management, though the extent to which this occurred was somewhat variable. 
Opinions were divided as to whether it was feasible or desirable to implement a 
common approach to risk assessment across different disciplinary groups, though a 
greater degree of consistency would be welcomed.  
                                                     
27 One social work respondent cited an instance in which 20 people attended a case conference.  
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6.37 Multi-agency risk management operated in different ways and at different levels 
within various settings. The strengths of multi-agency approaches to risk management 
included the increased ability to tailor responses to the risks presented by an 
individual and the avoidance of a single agency being held accountable for any 
adverse outcomes. Effective multi-agency approaches could, however, be undermined 
by issues such as the failure to share relevant information and the varied approaches 
adopted by different agencies towards risk assessments and their interpretation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 This study has revealed wide variations in the approaches adopted to risk 
assessment by different professional groups. Even within agencies or professional 
groups different methods of risk assessment were evident. Police respondents to the 
audit, for example, highlighted the absence of a national approach to risk assessment, 
which could create difficulties when offenders moved from one part of the country to 
another. This issue has been recognised by ACOP (Scotland) which has established a 
working group to identify the most appropriate tool for use on a national basis. The 
introduction of a consistent approach to risk assessment should facilitate the sharing 
of information across forces and reduce the likelihood of differing interpretations 
being placed on risk assessments derived from different approaches.  
 
7.2 The Scottish Prison Service is also in the process of introducing a standardised 
approach to risk assessment which draws upon a battery of risk assessment tools. Risk 
assessments will be undertaken by psychologists on all prisoners sentenced to four 
years or more to inform their management within the prison system, to facilitate the 
matching of prisoners to appropriate prisoner programmes and to inform decisions 
about their release. However the absence of a co-ordinated approach to risk 
assessment between prisons and community-based services will, unless addressed, 
limit the usefulness of prison-based assessments once a prisoner has been released. 
 
7.3 The audit has also highlighted the limited use being made of tools for assessing 
risk of sexual or violent offending that have been appropriately validated. The use of 
validated instruments was most evident in prison and mental health settings, though 
the fact that tools had not been validated on Scottish psychiatric populations was 
thought to detract from their value with the latter. Where tools used by social workers 
had been validated, these had not been validated for use with Scottish offender 
populations and their ability to predict risk of sexual and violent offending and risk of 
harm had not been assessed. 
 
7.4 With a few exceptions – usually specialist projects working with sex offenders – 
the tools employed by social workers had been developed as generic risk assessment 
instruments and were not designed specifically to assess the risk presented by serious 
violent or sexual offenders. The most commonly used tools – the RAGF and the LSI-
R – had complementary weakness and strengths but neither was considered sufficient 
for the task. Whilst RAGF was better able to identity risk of harm, it had not been 
validated and was considered by some to over-rely upon subjective judgement. LSI-R 
was viewed as useful in aiding targeting of resources, informing supervision plans and 
facilitating the measurement of change but it was limited in its ability to assess the 
risk of harm and had not been validated for use in the Scottish context. More 
importantly, strong doubts were expressed about the value of the LSI-R with sexual 
offenders, young people, violent offenders and women. 
 
 
CRITERIA FOR THE CHOICE OF RISK TOOLS 
 
7.5 There was clearly some interest among various professional groups in the 
development of a standard approach to risk assessment. However this was 
accompanied by a recognition that in practice it was not something that might easily 
be achieved. In the interim there would be some merit in a movement towards the 
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adoption of tools for assessing risk of serious violent or sexual offending based on 
their ‘fitness for purpose’ since at present factors other than their validity and 
predictive ability often appear to have informed the approaches to risk assessment 
employed. This report therefore concludes by summarising what existing research 
would suggest are essential  and desirable characteristics of risk assessment tools for 
use with these groups of offenders.  
 
7.6 Existing research would suggest that the following are essential features of risk 
assessment tools: 
 
• Validated – at least one peer reviewed publication on validation of the tool 
• Validated against a relevant population commensurate with the target group 
for the tool 
• Actuarially based and empirically grounded in risk factors with a proven track 
record in the research literature 
• Must be able to differentiate between high, medium and low risk with a high 
degree of accuracy (to ensure risk categories and subsequent risk management 
plans are justified and proportionate)28 
• Has inter-rater/assessor reliability (all assessors will use the tool the same with 
the same result) 
• If possible, validated against a Scottish population (or it could be validated 
retrospectively in a reasonable time-scale, for example against case, prison or 
parole records) 
 
7.7 The following, on the other hand, can be considered desirable features of risk 
assessment tools: 
 
• User-friendly 
• Resource lean 
• ‘Easy’ to train staff to use appropriately 
• Process of use is transparent and accountable29 
 
7.8 It is then possible, drawing upon the material summarised by Kemshall (2002) and 
the experiences reported by respondents who have used them to classify each of the 
main risk assessment tools employed in Scotland against these criteria (Table 7.1). 
                                                     
28 Essential for Human Rights compliance 
29 Again important for HR compliance 
 Table 7.1: Criteria for the selection of risk assessment tools 
 
  
Essential criteria 
 
 
Desirable criteria 
Tool Validated Validated on 
relevant 
population 
Actuarially 
based and 
empirically 
grounded 
Accurate 
differentiation 
of risk levels 
Inter-
relater 
reliability 
Validated 
against Scottish 
population 
User friendly Resource 
lean 
Easy to train 
staff to use 
appropriately 
Transparent 
and 
accountable 
RAG-F 
 
✖ ✖ ✔ ? ? ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
LSI-R 
 
✔ ✖ ✔ ✔A ? ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Matrix 2000 
 
✔ ✔B ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ 
HCR 20 
 
✔ ✔C ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
Tay Project 
Assessment 
✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
PCL-R 
 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Static 99 
 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
VRAG 
 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
 
                                                     
A With general offender populations but not established with serious violent or sexual offenders. 
B Validated only with male prisoner population. 
C Mostly validated on patient populations.  
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7.9 This classification may assist practitioners in assessing the potential value of some 
of the range of tools that are available to assist in the assessment risk among serious 
violent and sexual offenders. Overall there appears to be some trade off between 
predictive validity on the one hand and ease of administration on the other. Those 
tools which appear best suited to assessing risk of offending and risk of harm among 
the specific groups of offenders who are the subject of this report are those that have 
been developed specifically for this purpose and whose administration requires both 
training in their use and clinical skills.  
 
7.10 In addition, such tools are often highly specific, developed in particular settings 
such as psychiatric hospitals or prisons, and are targeted at particular client groups 
(for example the PCL-R at high risk psychopaths).  It cannot therefore be assumed 
that they will have general transference to all high risk groups.  This suggests that tool 
selection must also pay attention to the target group of the tool (sexual, violent, 
psychopathic) as well as to the other essential criteria.  This indicates that risk 
assessment is unlikely to be carried out in the future by one stand alone tool, but is 
perhaps better understood as a process in which a combination of well validated tools 
may be required.  This may, for example, consist of a user friendly, validated tool for 
initial screening for high risk for use by frontline criminal justice practitioners. In 
those few cases that warrant further in-depth assessment in order to provide well 
informed risk management strategies or to inform courts in the cases where an Order 
for Lifelong Restriction is being considered, appropriately chosen specific tools could 
also be used. 
 
7.11 The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that there is currently no 
consistent, co-ordinated approach to the assessment of the risk presented by serious 
violent and sexual offenders in Scotland. Different professional groups are utilising 
different methods of risk assessment. This undoubtedly detracts from the 
effectiveness of multi-agency risk assessments and may have adverse consequences 
for the effective management of offender risk, particularly for those offenders making 
the transition from secure penal or health settings into the community. 
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ANNEX ONE 
 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND ACCOMPANYING GUIDANCE USED 
IN THE AUDIT 
 
 
Guidance to those responsible for completing the forms  
 
 
SERIOUS SEXUAL AND VIOLENT OFFENDERS: 
AUDIT OF RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN USE IN SCOTLAND 
 
The University of Stirling and De Montfort University have been commissioned by 
the Scottish Executive Justice Department to undertake an analysis of risk assessment 
and recidivism among serious violent and sexual offenders in Scotland. The research 
has been commissioned following the recommendation of the MacLean Committee on 
Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders that more research was required on risk 
assessment and recidivism in relation to this group. As part of that analysis we are 
seeking information from organisations and individuals who are involved in assessing 
or managing the risk posed by serious violent or sexual offenders. The ultimate aim of 
the study is to inform better integration of different types of risk assessment and 
management.  
 
The attached questionnaire is seeking information about the use of tools to assess risk 
among serious violent and sexual offenders in Scotland. The questionnaire forms the 
basis of an audit of risk assessment tools, by which we mean a survey aimed at 
establishing which tools are being used by relevant organisations and in what way. 
We are particularly interested in learning what tools are being used and how they are 
being used in different contexts: that is, in how they are being used in your 
organisation. 
  
We are also, however, interested in the extent to which risk assessment tools have 
been validated. Validation means that the tool has been tested to determine how 
accurate it is at predicting the outcome it is intended to predict. Equally, we are 
interested in whether the tools are being used with the types of offenders in respect of 
whom they have been validated. This is of interest since it is important to get a sense 
of how robust risk assessments undertaken by organisations using these tools are 
likely to be. It may be that you are unable to provide responses to these questions, in 
which case we would ask you to indicate this in the appropriate places on the form. 
 
We are also reviewing information about recidivism among serious violent and sexual 
offenders in the Scottish context. The review will consider the issues associated with 
assessing recidivism and aim to estimate the numbers of offenders in Scotland who 
pose a continuing high risk. To this end, the audit of risk assessment tools also 
contains a few questions aimed at estimating the numbers of serious and violent 
offenders who are currently known by the organisations who complete the audit. We 
appreciate that this information is likely to an approximate estimate and for this 
reason are also seeking some information as to the basis on which the estimate was 
made. 
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Completion of the audit
Your organisation has identified you as someone who has knowledge of the use of risk
assessment instruments with serious violent and sexual offenders and who can
therefore provide the information required. Please complete the forms enclosed with
regard to your particular area of responsibility: if risk assessments of this kind are
undertaken in a number of contexts or by different professional groups, then it is
likely that your organisation will have identified others who can complete a separate
set of forms in relation to their specific areas of responsibility.  Again, we should
stress that we are interested in what risk assessment tools are being used and how
they are being used in your organisation.
The audit consists of two parts. The first part is seeking summary information about
the range of tools in use in your organisation. The second part is seeking information
about the use of each of these tools.  In this part of the audit a separate audit form
should be completed for each tool in use. Most of the questions simply require you
to indicate which of a number of options applies and to provide more detailed
information only if the circumstances that apply have not been covered by the existing
options. Since we are asking you only to complete one summary form, it is important
that this form and the completed audit forms for the individual tools are returned
together. It would be helpful if they could be returned to the University of Stirling by
18 January 2002.
The audit form can be copied as required. If you would prefer to complete the form
electronically, we can arrange for you to do so. Please e-mail me at
g.c.mcivor@stir.ac.uk and I will arrange for one to be e-mailed to you.
We hope that the form will be relatively easy to complete. However, if you have any
questions about completion of the form, please do not hesitate to contact me at the
above e-mail address or telephone 01786 467724.
Yours sincerely
Professor Gill McIvor
Social Work Research Centre
University of Stirling
Stirling FK9 4LA
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SERIOUS SEXUAL AND VIOLENT OFFENDERS:
AUDIT OF RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN USE IN SCOTLAND
SUMMARY FORM
Name and address of organisation





Name of contact Designation
 .
Telephone number 
OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN USE
Which risk assessment tools are being used by you/your organisation to assess risk
among serious violent or sexual offenders? Please indicate from the list below, which
tools are in use. Please tick all that apply and add any tools that you are using that are
not included.
Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG)    #
Sex Offender Risk Appraisal (SORAG)    #
Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender Recidivism (RRASOR) #
Structured Anchored Clinical Judgement (SACJ)    #
Static-99    #
Matrix 2000 #
HCR-20    #
 Psychopathy Checklist  Revised (PCL-R)    #
Sexual Violence SVR-20    #
Early Assessment Risk for Boys (EARL  20B)    #
Level of Service Inventory - Revised (LSI-R)    #
Offender Group Reconviction Score (OGRS)    #
         SWSI Risk Assessment Guidance and Framework (RAGF) #
ACE    #
OASys    #
Other tools in use (please specify):
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 ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF SERIOUS VIOLENT OR SEXUAL
OFFENDERS
As indicated in the accompanying guidance, we are also taking the opportunity of
using this audit as a means of estimating the numbers of serious violent and sexual
offenders who are currently known to a range of organisations in Scotland. To do this,
we would ask you to consider the following definition and indicate how many
offenders your organisation is in contact with who meet the definition.
1. How many people known to your organisation would meet the first criterion?
 
 
 
2. On what basis have you made this estimate?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. How many people known to your organisation would meet the second criterion?
 
 
 
A person may be defined as a serious violent or sexual offender if s/he presents a substantial
and continuing risk to public safety as evidenced by her/his meeting one of the following
criteria:
a) the offender has been found guilty of offences that demonstrate a likelihood of causing
death or serious physical or psychological harm to the public and has demonstrate d
substantially harmful behaviour which indicates that the offenders future behaviour is
unlikely to have regard for the normal standards of behaviour restraint and therefore may lead
to further substantially harmful conduct; or there is a pattern of behaviour which suggests that
such likelihood exists.
(b) the offender has been found guilty of offences that demonstrate a pattern of aggressive
behaviour which demonstrates a substantial degree of indifference for the consequences for
others and has demonstrated substantially harmful behaviour which indicates that the
offenders future behaviour is unlikely to have regard for the normal standards of behaviour
restraint and therefore may lead to further substantially harmful conduct; or there is a pattern
of behaviour which suggests that such likelihood exists.
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4. On what basis have you made this estimate?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. How many people known to your organisation would be considered ‘dangerous’
according to these criteria, but only as a result of a treatable mental illness?
 
 
 
6. On what basis have you made this estimate?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. How many people known to your organisation have a history of mental illness but would
be considered ‘dangerous’ according to these criteria even in the absence of the mental
illness?
 
 
 
8. On what basis have you made this estimate?
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Thank you for completing this section of the audit. Please now complete one copy of the audit
form enclosed for each risk assessment tool that is used by your organisation in relation to
serious sexual or violent offenders.
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PLEASE COMPLETE ONE AUDIT FORM FOR EACH TOOL USED
SECTION ONE: TOOLS AND THEIR USE
1. What is the name of the risk assessment tool?
 
 
 
 
2. What type of tool is this (please tick)?
 
 Actuarial (i.e. using a formal objective procedure, such as an equation) !
 Structured clinical (i.e. based on clinical assessment of risk factors) !
 A combination of  both !
 
3. What types of risk factors are assessed by the tool?
 
 Static (factors not amenable to change such as age, criminal history)  !
 Dynamic (factors amenable to change, such as offender attitudes)  !
 Both   !
 
4. With what types of offenders is the tool used in your organisation? (please tick all that
apply)
 
 Sexual offenders !
 Violent offenders !
 Sexual and violent offenders !
 Mentally disordered offenders !
 Any offenders (generic) !
 Other specific groups of offenders (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. With what age group of offenders is the tool used in your organisation (please tick all that
apply)?
 
 Under 16  ! 16-17 !
 18-20  ! 21-25 !
 26-30  ! 31-35 !
 36-40  ! 41-60 !
 61 and older  !
 
6. With what sex of offender is the tool used in your organisation (please tick all that apply)?
 
 Male ! Female !
 
7. Approximately how many offenders are assessed by this tool per annum in your
organisation?
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8. What types of risks does this tool assess? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Risk of recidivism (general) !
 Risk of recidivism (sexual) !
 Risk of recidivism (violent) !
 Risk of harm !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. How often is the tool used in your organisation as part of a battery of tools (that is, in
combination with other tools aimed at assessing offender risk)?
 
 Always !
 Usually !
 Sometimes !
 Never !
 
10. If it is used as part of a battery of tools, with which other tools is it used?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SECTION TWO: HOW THE TOOL IS USED
 
11. In what settings is the tool used in your organisation? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Community justice (social work) !
 Community justice (police) !
 Prison !
 Mental health (in-patient) !
 Mental health (out-patient) !
 Medium secure unit !
 Secure unit !
 Local forensic units !
 Hostel !
 Supported accommodation !
 Specialist project (community-based) !
 Specialist project (prison-based) !
 Specialist project (health-based) !
 Other (please specify) !
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12. For what purpose is the tool used in your organisation? (please tick all that apply)
 
 To inform recommendations in reports to the court !
 To inform recommendations to the Parole Board !
 To inform decisions about registration  !
 To inform decisions regarding release from prison !
 To inform decisions regarding release from hospital !
 To develop treatment/intervention plans  !
 To review treatment/intervention plans !
 To inform risk management strategies within the organisation !
 To inform multi-agency risk management strategies  !
 To assess/measure offender change !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. How is the tool administered in your organisation?
 
 Using existing records !
 Through interview !
 Both !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. What types and grades of staff are involved in the use of the tool in your organisation?
(please tick all that apply)
 Grades
 Psychologists !
 
 Psychiatrists !
 
 Social workers !
 
 Police officers !
 
 Prison officers !
 
 Psychiatric nurses !
 
 Other (please specify)
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15. What training have staff in your organisation received in the use of the tool?
 
 Initial training as specified by those who developed the tool   !
 Further training in addition to that specified !
 Training developed locally !
 None !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. What mechanisms are in place in your organisation to ensure that the tool is being used
appropriately? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Staff supervision !
 Observation of the use of the tool !
 Video-recording of the use of the tool !
 Sampling of cases in which the tool was administered !
 None !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
17. How is the tool interpreted or scored in your organisation?
 
 With reference to a scoring manual !
 Through the use of professional/clinical judgement !
 Using a computerised programme !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. By whom is the tool interpreted or scored?
 
 The person who administers it !
 A psychologist !
 Other (please specify) !
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19. Do these assessments inform risk management strategies in your organisation?
 
 Yes !
 No !
 
20. If yes, how do they inform risk management strategies? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Identifying risk factors to be reduced through programme provision !
 Identifying the level of monitoring/surveillance required !
 Identifying the likely impact of the risk should it occur !
 Informing decisions about conditions to be attached to orders/licences !
 Informing decisions about how any conditions should be enforced !
 Informing the role of different professionals in risk management !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
21. What other information, if any, is used to inform risk management strategies in your
organisation? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Information from existing agency records !
 Information from interviews with the offender !
 Information from other agencies !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SECTION THREE: CHOICE OF TOOL AND VALIDATION
 
22. What were your organisation’s reasons for adopting this tool? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Ability to identify risk of sexual offending !
 Ability to identify risk of violent offending !
 Ability to identify risk of harm !
 Ease of administration and/or scoring !
 Known accuracy of the tool !
 Knowledge of its use in other locations !
 To ensure compatibility with other agencies !
 Cost !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
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23. What do you see as the strengths of this tool? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Ability to identify risk of sexual offending !
 Ability to identify risk of violent offending !
 Ability to identify risk of harm !
 Ease of administration and/or scoring !
 Known accuracy of the tool !
 Widely used in other agencies !
 Enables compatibility with other agencies !
 Cost !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. What do you see as the weaknesses of this tool? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Inability to identify risk of sexual offending !
 Inability to identify risk of violent offending !
 Inability to identify risk of harm !
 Difficult to administer and/or score !
 Predictive accuracy unknown !
 Not widely used in other agencies !
 Is not compatible with tools used by other agencies !
 Cost !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. Has the tool been validated (that is, its predictive ability assessed)?
 
 Yes !
 No !
 Don’t know !
 
26. If yes, by whom has it been validated?
 
 The person who developed it
 By my organisation
 Don’t know
 Other (please specify)
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27. If yes, what types of offenders were used to validate it? (please tick all that apply)
 
 a) Sexual offenders:
 
 In prison !
 In mental health settings !
 On community supervision !
 In specialist programmes !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b) Violent offenders:
 
 In prison !
 In mental health settings !
 On community supervision !
 In specialist programmes !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
28. Has the tool been specifically validated for use? (please tick all that apply): -
 
 Yes No  Don’t know
 In the UK (i.e. validated on UK sample) ! ! !
 In Scotland (i.e. validated on Scottish sample) ! ! !
 With juveniles (under 16 years) ! ! !
 With young offenders (16-20 years) ! ! !
 With adult offenders (21 years and over) ! ! !
 With male offenders ! ! !
 With female offenders ! ! !
 With offenders with mental health problems ! ! !
 
29. If it has not been validated, does your organisation plan to validate the tool?
 
 Yes  !
 No  !
 Don’t know !
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30. If yes on whom will it be validated?:
 
 a) Sexual offenders:
 
 In prison !
 In mental health settings !
 On community supervision !
 In specialist programmes !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b) Violent offenders:
 
 In prison !
 In mental health settings !
 On community supervision !
 In specialist programmes !
 Don’t know !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
31. Which types of offenders will it be validated for use with? (please tick all that apply)
 
 Juveniles (under 16 years) !
 Young offenders (16-20 years) !
 Adult offenders (21 years and over) !
 Male offenders !
 Female offenders !
 Offenders with mental health problems !
 
32. What type of timescale is envisaged?
 
 Validation will be completed within the next 12 months !
 Validation will be completed within the next 2 years !
 Validation will be completed within the next 5 years !
 Don’t know !
 
 
 SECTION FOUR: MULTI-AGENCY USE OF TOOLS
 
33. Is the tool used to assess risk in a multi-agency context?
 
 Always !
 Usually !
 Sometimes !
 Never !
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34. If it is used in this way, what other agencies/professionals are involved? (please tick all
that apply)
 
 Police officers !
 Prison officers !
 Social workers !
 Psychologists !
 Psychiatrists !
 Psychiatric nurses !
 Other mental health professionals !
 Housing professionals !
 Education professionals !
 Other (please specify) !
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Have any issues arisen through the use of the tool in multi-agency risk assessment and
management?
 
 Yes !
 No !
 Don’t know !
 
36. If yes, what types of issues have arisen? (please tick all that apply)
Other agencies using different tools !
Lack of agreement over interpretation of results !
Lack of clarity as to how tool should inform risk management !
Other (please specify) !
Many thanks for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please return the completed
audit form/s to the Social Work Research Centre in the envelope provided (no stamp needed)
by 18 January 2002 or earlier if possible.
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ANNEX TWO
SUMMARY OF MAIN RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS FOR USE WITH
SERIOUS VIOLENT AND SEXUAL OFFENDERS
GENERIC TOOLS
LSI-R is an actuarial predictive scale which combines risk of re-offending and needs
assessment (Andrews and Bonta, 1995). It uses static factors such as age and previous
convictions and dynamic factors such as alcohol or accommodation problems.  It was
developed in Canada with the purpose of matching offenders to probation interventions. The
assessment is completed with the offender and recorded on a form.  Problem areas are scored
and the total number of problem ‘points’ indicates the level of risk of re-offending.
Guidance is given about appropriate levels of supervision or containment according to the
level of risk an offender poses and problem areas such as employment or drug misuse are
identified for appropriate programmes or intervention. A number of local authority social
work departments in Scotland now use LSI-R.  Its applicability to Scottish offenders has
recently been assessed. This analysis suggested that it may be less well suited to certain
groups of offenders, including women (McIvor et al., 2001).
The RAGF (sometimes referred to as RA1-4) is a structured professional judgement tool
combining actuarial indicators with clinical or professional judgements (Social Work Services
Inspectorate, 2000).  It was developed by the Scottish Executive in consultation with the
Association of Directors of Social Work.  It incorporates risk of re-offending (RA1),
criminogenic need (RA2) and risk of harm (RA3) schedules with a full risk of harm schedule
(RA4) for high-risk offenders requiring risk management action plans.  It is still in evolving
form and has been piloted in 17 local authorities across Scotland.  The RA1 uses the same
predictive factors as the Offender Group Reconviction Score (OGRS) used widely in England
and Wales, but there is no algorithm to determine precise levels of risk and judgements are
made using ‘high’, ‘medium’, or ‘low’ descriptions. The assessment is completed with the
offender and recorded on the schedule and it may take a number of sessions to complete. The
predictive capacity of the RAGF is currently being assessed by the Social Work Research
Centre at the University of Stirling.
TOOLS FOR ASSESSING RISK OF SEXUAL OFFENDING
The SORAG is an adaptation of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and is
principally designed for use with men convicted (or committed to psychiatric institutions) for
offences of rape or child molestation (Quinsey et al., 1998). It comprises a fourteen-item
multi-variate assessment guide that includes a psychopathy score and which draws upon a
range of static and dynamic factors.  It is the subject of ongoing evaluation.
Sexual Violence Risk–20 – SVR-20 - is a 20-item instrument that covers a range of static and
dynamic factors and includes items aimed at informing risk management plans (Boer et al.,
1997). Some of the items in the tool are drawn directly from the HCR-20 (see below). SVR-
20 is being used by the Scottish Prison Service to provide a more detailed assessment of risk
of sexual violence among offenders initially assessed using HCR-20.
72
The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offence Recidivism (RRASOR) is essentially an
actuarially based tool that weights a number of key variables in terms of their predictive
utility (Hanson, 1997).  The initial seven items were based upon a meta-analysis and four
were subsequently substantiated as having predictive accuracy for sex offence recidivism. The
variables that comprise the tool can be scored to produce an overall risk weighting.  The
ability of the tool to distinguish between high and low risk has been validated and it has been
extensively tested both on both developmental and validation samples.
The Structured Anchored Clinical Judgement (SACJ) attempts to avoid over-dependence
upon static predictors (e.g. age, gender) and archival data (e.g. previous convictions) by
including a more dynamic component to allow for changes in risk status over time (Hanson
and Thornton, 2000). It operates as a three-stage ‘step-wise’ system rather than a simple
summative process based on weighted items as is the case with RRASOR. Stage One involves
an initial actuarial screening based on five items. Stage Two consists of a more in-depth
analysis of aggravating factors, including the addition of dynamic factors. Stage Three
consists of the careful monitoring of offender performance over time to note the impact of
treatment on risky dispositions, and is heavily reliant upon the availability of clinical data and
information on dynamic factors. A shortened version of the SACJ using stage 1 and the first
four variables of stage 2 and known as SACJ –MIN is also available although it has yet to be
extensively tested outside the United Kingdom prison population.
RRASOR and the SACJ-Min have been combined to produce STATIC 99 (Hanson and
Thornton, 1999).  Research found that STATIC 99 outperformed both the RRASOR and
SACJ-MIN though the improved prediction achieved was relatively small. STATIC 99 is a
developing tool to which further dynamic risk factors are likely to be added to improve its
predictive accuracy.
The SACJ has subsequently been updated into MATRIX 2000 (Hanson and Thornton, 2000).
MATRIX 2000 represents an important improvement on the SACJ as it provides for greater
accuracy and refinement in the identification of high risk offenders, and offers two versions,
one for sex offenders and one for violent offenders.  Whilst the tool has not yet been subject
to extensive published evaluations, it has been validated retrospectively. Development and
validation of both versions have however been undertaken with male offenders (and often
male prisoners) and they may have a limited transferability to other groups. Furthermore,
these tools are also designed to predict recidivism and not levels of harm: the latter is a key
concern for staff tasked with decisions about release, community location, treatment
interventions and victim safety.
TOOLS FOR ASSESSING RISK OF VIOLENT OFFENDING
The Violence Risk Assessment Guide  (VRAG) is the most widely used actuarial tool for
violence offence recidivism (Quinsey et al., 1998). It was developed in Canada, based upon
patients detained in secure hospitals between 1965 and 1980, and has been the subject of
extensive evaluation which has confirmed its predictive utility.  The VRAG contains twelve
items, with weighted factors used to assign individuals to one of nine risk categories. The
limitations of the VRAG include its inability to predict the nature, severity, imminence, and
frequency of future violence and its tendency to encourage those who use it to ignore other
risk factors that might be strongly associated with violence. VRAG also does not provide a
basis upon which risk management plans can be developed.
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The Violence Prediction Scheme (VPS) is designed for the assessment of dangerousness in
high-risk men (Webster et al., 1994).  The scheme utilises the twelve items of the VRAG
(called RAG) to produce an actuarial score, combined with structured assessment of ten,
largely dynamic items: antecedent history, self presentation, social and psychological
adjustment, expectations and plans, symptoms, supervision, life factors, institutional
management, sexual adjustment, and treatment progress.  While the addition of the dynamic
factors adds very little to the accuracy of the actuarial (V)RAG score, the structured clinical
assessment is importance for the establishment of treatability and formulation of appropriate
risk management plans.
The HCR-20 is a systematic model for assessing the risk of violence (Webster et al., 1997).
The assessment combines historical factors that have a track record in predicting risk, with
clinical variables such as respondent insight, attitude, motivation to change and for treatment,
stability, and general symptomology.  In addition, the assessment tool has the ‘value-added’
component of structuring the assessor's attention towards case management plans, motivation
to change and individual coping mechanisms. The HCR-20 is divided into 3 sub-scales: a
historical scale, a clinical scale and a risk management scale.  Whilst initially formulated as an
‘aide memoire’ in order to make decisions transparent, the predictive validity of the HCR-20
has been evaluated and its applicability to the Scottish context has been assessed (Cooke et
al., 2001).
The Psychopathy Check List-Revised (PCL-R) and its derivatives (the PCL:YV for
adolescents and the PCL:SV ‘screening version’) is a clinical construct rating scale used in
semi-structured interview (Hare, 1991). It involves rating 20 items on a 3 point scale divided
into three broad categories: interpersonal/affective, social deviance and ‘additional items’. As
Kemshall (2002) observes, whilst initially developed from research on male forensic patients
and offenders, various studies have confirmed the applicability of the PCL-R to other offender
and patient populations. It has also been shown to be a highly reliable tool when used by well-
trained assessors. Although not designed as a measurement of violence risk, it may measure
the most important factor in the risk of predatory violence, that is, psychopathy.
Spousal Assault Risk Assessment (SARA) is a 20-item checklist that has been designed to
screen for risk factors for spousal or family-related assault (Kropp et al. 1999). It covers a
range of static, dynamic and risk management factors, drawing in part upon items included in
the HCR-20. Like the SVR-20 it is being employed by the Scottish Prison Service to provide
a more detailed assessment of risk of spousal assault among offenders initially assessed using
HCR-20.
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